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Managing Mass Tort Class Actions:
Judicial Politics and Rulemaking in Three
Acts
TOBY S. GOLDBACH*
Judges take part in a variety of non-adjudicative tasks that
shape the structure of litigation. In addition to their managerial functions, judges sit as administrative heads of court.
They participate in civil justice reform projects and develop
procedures for criminal and civil trials. What norms and
principles ought to guide judges in this other work? In their
casework we expect judges to be neutral and fair, setting
aside politics and rationally following the law. Indeed, this
article will demonstrate that there is good reason to insist on
these qualities in both judges’ case-related and broader
court-related reform activities. To test this proposition, this
article examines the work of judges who sat on the Advisory
Committee for Civil Rules, the committee that evaluates and
makes recommendations for rule amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, this Article reviews
the committee’s nearly thirty-year effort to make rules for
approving settlements in mass tort class actions. The review
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reveals politics and competition not only between judges and
Congress for the authority to design rules of procedure, but
also points to a lesser explored phenomenon, of competition
between judges of the different levels of court.
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INTRODUCTION1
Contemporary discourse about the judiciary tries to unpack the
extent to which judges are ideological, policy-preferencing individuals, sitting on the left or right of a highly politicized U.S.2 The Supreme Court confirmation hearings—those “grotesque”3 “spectacles”4—are especially vital because it is assumed judges will vote in
1

This article relies on data collected from a review of all Agenda Books of
the Advisory Committee of Civil Rules from 1990-2019, supplemented with a
review of relevant meeting minutes and subcommittee reports. In addition to information on legal reforms, sociological data was collected with respect to committee meeting length, type of meeting (in person or teleconference), number of
people and number of judges in attendance, location of committee meetings,
whether Rule 23 was on the committee’s agenda, and number of pages in the
agenda book devoted to a discussion of Rule 23.
2
See, e.g., Adam Chilton et al., The Endgame of Court-Packing 11 (April
27, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3835502; Nelson Tebbe & Micah Schwartzman, Re-upping Appeasement: Religious Freedom and Judicial Politics in the
2019 Term, 2019-2020 ACS SUP. CT. REV. 115, 122; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Judicial Politics and Decisionmaking: A New
Approach, 70 VAND. L. REV. 2051, 2056–57 (2017); Adam Bonica & Maya Sen,
The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives to Introduce Ideology into Judicial Selection, 60 J.L. & ECON.
559, 560 (2017); Jeanne Hersant & Cecile Vigour, Judicial Politics on the
Ground, 42 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 292, 296 (2017); Anthony Niblett & Albert H.
Yoon, Judicial Disharmony: A Study of Dissent, 42 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 60, 70
(2015); David E. Adelman & Robert L. Glicksman, Presidential and Judicial Politics in Environmental Litigation, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 40 (2018); Lee Epstein &
Jack Knight, Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 11, 12
(2013); Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 191, 253 (2012); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Several Meanings of
“Politics” in Judicial Politics Studies: Why Ideological Influence Is not “Partisanship,” 61 EMORY L.J. 759, 762 (2012); Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 341, 351 (2010);
David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration:
Seeking an Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383,
413 (2010); Timothy R. Johnson, Justice David Stras, Judicial Politics and Federal Court Nomination Politics, 95 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 125, 129 (2011);
Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, DUKE L.J., 1383, 1436
(2009); Isaac Unah & Ange-Marie Hancock, U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making, Case Salience, and the Attitudinal Model, 28 L. & POL’Y 295, 295 (2006);
Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 264 (2005);
LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 33–49 (1998);
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 1–7 (1993).
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line with the party that nominates them.5 Thus, a widely successful
area of research on judicial behavior, “largely the province of political science,”6 asks whether judges base their decisions on extra legal factors such as ideology and political preferences.7 It is important to recognize that scholars are tough on judges precisely because our society expects judges to adhere to the role of neutral, impartial officiator.8 Any judicial devolution into politics poses an existential threat to a morally sound legal institution.9 Unfortunately,
most investigations into the question about whether or not judges
are political have remained tied to formal legal outcomes and institutions.10 Notwithstanding over a century of scholarship challenging
3
Doreen St. Félix, The Ford-Kavanaugh Hearing Will Be Remembered as
a Grotesque Display of Patriarchal Resentment, NEW YORKER (Sept. 27, 2018)
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/the-ford-kavanaughhearings-will-be-remembered-for-their-grotesque-display-of-patriarchal-resentment.
4
Olivia B. Waxman, Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings Weren’t Always Such a Spectacle. There’s a Reason That Changed, TIME (Sept. 6, 2018,
10:57 AM) https://time.com/5382104/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court-confirmation-hearing-history/.
5
See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Neil Gorsuch? The Surprise Behind the Supreme
Court’s Surprising LGBTQ Decision, WASH. POST (June 16, 2020, 8:06 P.M.)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/neil-gorsuch-gaytransgender-rights-supreme-court/2020/06/16/112f903c-afe3-11ea-8f5663f38c990077_story.html.
6
Carroll Seron & Susan S. Silbey, Profession, Science, and Culture: An
Emergent Canon of Law and Society Research, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION
TO LAW AND SOCIETY 30, 38 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004). See generally Frank B.
Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 252 (1997); LEE EPSTEIN ET
AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 25 (2013).
7
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 26–27 (2002); see also Epstein & Jacobi, supra
note 2, at 351.
8
Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1064 (1975).
9
See Martin H. Redish, Separation of Powers, Judicial Authority, and the
Scope of Article III: The Troubling Cases of Morrison and Mistretta, 39 DEPAUL
L. REV. 299, 299–304 (1990). See generally Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 643 (1989) (analyzing the history of the political question doctrine and its
role within the judiciary).
10
Seron & Silbey, supra note 6, at 30–31; see, e.g., Niblett & Yoon, supra
note 2, at 70; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7, at 1; LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE
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formalistic notions of law,11 scholarship about judges has remained
relatively stagnant, focusing on the judicial decision as the only
place to find evidence of judicial politics.
Yet scholarship that focuses solely on judicial decisions operates
on the basis of an outdated view of what judges do,12 reflecting only
the most visible and official portrait of judges’ work.13 It was forty
years ago when Judith Resnik introduced the “managerial judge,”
arguing that judges did not simply adjudicate cases presented to
them by adversarial parties.14 Judges also took and continue to take
part in a variety of managerial tasks, such as negotiating with parties
OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR

21 (1997); Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court,
SUP. CT. REV. 301, 304 (2017); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES
POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5 (2007); Keren Weinshall-Margel, Attitudinal and Neo-Institutional Models of Supreme
Court Decision Making: An Empirical and Comparative Perspective from Israel,
8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 556, 580 (2011); Harry Annison, Interpreting the
Politics of the Judiciary: The British Senior Judicial Tradition and the Pre-Emptive Turn in Criminal Justice, 41 J.L. & SOC’Y 339, 348 (2014).
11
Richard L. Abel, Law and Society: Project and Practice, 6 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 1, 18 (2010); Rita J. Simon & James P. Lynch, The Sociology of Law:
Where We Have Been and Where We Might Be Going, 23 L. & SOC’Y REV. 825,
826 (1989); Carroll Seron et al., Is There a Canon of Law and Society?, 9 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 287, 299 (2013); Kevin E. Davis et al., Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance, 46 L. & SOC’Y REV. 71, 91 (2012);
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 11 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory C. Shaffer
eds., 2015).
12
See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
459 (2004) (examining trials in federal and state courts); Judith Resnik, Trial as
Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 Harv.
L. Rev. 924 (2000) (analyzing the role of judges in an environment where trial is
seen as “error”); Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA.
L. REV. 1669 (2017) (discussing multidistrict litigation’s place in textbook discussions of civil procedure); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict
Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71 (2015) (discussing judges’ roles in multidistrict
litigation); see also Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against (“Settlement”
Not Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1204–05 (2009) (“The rules of civil
procedure contemplate, and even encourage, settlement behavior at virtually
every stage of litigation.”).
13
Mitchel de S.-O.-l’E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Portraits: Judicial Discourse
in the French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1334 (1995).
14
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376–77 (1982).
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about the timing and scope of trial.15 These activities shape the
course of the litigation and influence outcomes,16 but because they
happen “off the record,” in judges’ chambers or conference settlement rooms, they do not produce the kinds of outcomes that function
as source material for judicial behavior research.17
Similarly, judges’ reform work—work that is non-adjudicative
and designed to maintain the operation and relevancy of the judicial
system—remains out of view and understudied. Nevertheless,
judges engage in a variety of non-case-related law making activities,
including reforming sentencing guidelines,18 establishing problem-

15

Id. at 378.
See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 12, at 1673.
17
See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication,
89 GEO L.J. 371, 416, 431 (2001) (arguing that large complex aggregate litigation
is more akin to transactional deal-making, while judges’ in-court role is limited to
presiding over a hearing to review the settlement).
18
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 361 (1989); see also Jeffrey M.
Shaman, Judges and Non-Judicial Functions in the United States, in JUDICIARIES
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 512–33 (H. P. Lee ed., 2011); Redish, supra note
9, at 313.
16
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solving courts,19 and studying, drafting, and amending legal procedure.20 Where Resnik’s managerial judge’s atypical activities affected the outcome of a dispute between parties,21 judges’ institutional work on procedural rulemaking and court reform has a
broader impact, channeling possible substantive outcomes through
particular procedural forms. While this work remains out of view,
scholars have little opportunity to assess the politics and practices
involved.
19

See generally PHILIP BEAN, DRUGS AND CRIME 86 (4th ed. 2014) (comparing drug courts in the U.S. and Britain); W. CLINTON TERRY, III ET AL., THE
EARLY DRUG COURTS: CASE STUDIES IN JUDICIAL INNOVATION (W. Clinton
Terry, III ed., 1999) (discussing judicial innovation and developments in the early
drug courts); Bianca Easterly, The Ties that Bind Beyond the Battlefield: An Examination of the Diffusion Patterns of Veterans Treatment Courts 98 SOC. SCI. Q.
1622, 1623 (2017) (crediting Judge Sigurd E. Murphy, a retired U.S. Army brigadier general, and Judge Jack W. Smith, a retired U.S. Air Force colonel, as the
first to offer specialized services for veterans); Kevin S. Burke, Just What Made
Drug Courts Successful?, 36 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 39, 40
(2010); GREG BERMAN ET AL., GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING
JUSTICE 34–38 (2005) (analyzing problem solving courts in America); Glade F.
Roper, Introduction to Drug Courts, in DRUG COURTS: A NEW APPROACH TO
TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION (James E. Lessenger & Glade F. Roper eds.,
2007) (including articles discussing judges’ responses to the problems faced in
drug courts).
20
See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 530–32 (2001) (describing the Advisory Committee’s role in Rule 26 Discovery reforms); Charles Gardner Geyh,
Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in
Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1171–83 (1996) (documenting the judiciary’s
increased role in statutory reform and rulemaking, and the consequent heightened
level of interaction between the judiciary and Congress); Steven N. Subrin &
Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 1839, 1861–62 (2014) (describing the social processes involved in promoting case management); Toby S. Goldbach, Judicial Practice in Action: Court Reform and Responsive Judges in Canada, in THE RESPONSIVE JUDGE, 229–32
(Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski eds., 2018) (describing judges’ efforts to establish Indigenous courts); see also Toby S. Goldbach, Building the Aboriginal Conference Settlement Suite: Hope and Realism in Law as a Tool for Social Change,
46 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 116, 117 (2021). But see Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543,
1546 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s “power to make procedural law
constraining private enforcement through decisions . . . [has] been more consequential that its power to promulgate Federal Rules.”).
21
See Resnik, supra note 14, at 376–77.
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Contrastingly, this Article examines the activities of judges who
sat on the Advisory Committee for Civil Rules (“Advisory Committee”), the main rulemaking body that evaluates, provides notice of,
and recommends reforms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.22
The Article focuses on judges’ efforts to make specialized rules for
approving settlements in mass tort class actions,23 illustrating multiple destinations for judicial politics in addition to the judicial decision. The Article demonstrates competition not merely between
judges and Congress for the authority to make rules of procedure,
but also points to a lesser-explored phenomenon, of competition
within the “legal complex”24 and between judges of the different
levels of court.25
22

The current process for making rules for procedure comprises the following steps: The Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, commonly known as the “Standing Committee,” delegates to its five advisory committees—including the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure—the task of studying the federal rules. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2). The various committees recommend rule revisions to the Standing Committee, which, following a period of notice and comment, may recommend amendments to the justices of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court can then promulgate the new rule,
which, unless Congress enacts legislation against it, will take effect on or after
December 1. See How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works (last visited September 16, 2022).
23
See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Compensating Large Numbers of People for
Inflicted Harms, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 165, 166 (2001); Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute
Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 429 (1999); Alexandra D. Lahav,
Mass Tort Class Actions - Past, Present, and Future, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 111
(2017); Rubenstein, supra note 17, at 374; Anthony J. Scirica, Introduction, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1859 (2000); Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1943, 1943 (2000); Deborah R. Hensler,
Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large
Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 181–82 (2001).
24
Lucien Karpik & Terence C. Halliday, The Legal Complex, 7 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 217, 218 (2011).
25
For the scant reflections on the legal system’s internal relations and politics, see Terrance C. Halliday, Why the Legal Complex Is Integral to Theories of
Consequential Courts, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 337 (Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert A. Kagan
eds., 2013); Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 627–28 (2010); LEE EPSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 11.
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This Article takes a historical and socio-legal perspective to examine judges’ work on procedural reform. It does not take a position
on the normativity of adapting criteria for class certification in light
of a settlement agreement; others have written on this issue.26 Instead, the article asks whether judges engage in lawmaking activity
outside of, or in addition to, their regular casework, and whether this
work embroils judges in non-legal political contestations. We expect
judges to be “fair minded, impartial, patient, wise, efficient, and intelligent,” setting aside politics and rationally following the law, and
there is good reason to insist on these qualities in judges’ broader
court-related activities as well.27 Where judges craft rules for the
operation of trials—thus affecting substantive entitlements—those
activities ought to be guided by the familiar principles of neutrality,
fairness, and independence from political pressure and persuasion.28
Moreover, because of the hybrid nature of private and public interests in mass tort class action litigation29 and because of the prevalence of negotiated settlement as a way to resolve immense class

26

See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions,
82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 951 (2014); MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE
JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS
ACTION LAWSUIT 176–227 (2009); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 167 (2009);
Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute
Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 511 (2013).
27
Jeffrey Rachinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging the Judiciary by the
Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 1, 1
(2017).
28
Andrew D. Bradt, The Looming Battle for Control of Multidistrict Litigation in Historical Perspective, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 102–03 (2018); Geyh,
supra note 20, at 1201; Stempel, supra note 20, at 613; Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 252 (1998); Pamela K.
Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 773–74
(2017).
29
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty:
Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 71, 88 (2003); Macey & Miller, supra note 26, at 561 (2013); DEBORAH R.
HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN 85 (2000); Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in
Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 27–30 (2000).
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actions,30 it is critically important to assess the process by which
procedure is made to regulate class action settlement agreements. As
discussed in the next part, the Rules Enabling Act delegates authority for rulemaking to the Judicial Conference, establishing a democratically deliberative and participatory process for drafting and vetting rules.31 However, as is the case in many areas of law, the rules
“on the books” do not always translate to the way things happen “in
action.”32
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces judges’ other
work—on procedural reform, rulemaking, and institutional
change—and outlines three deficiencies with extant judicial politics
scholarship as it relates to judges’ other work and settling aggregate
litigation. Asking the reader to keep those concerns in mind, the remainder of the Article chronicles the Advisory Committee’s work
to address the particular difficulties in settling aggregate claims
through rules of procedure.
In December 2018, amendments to the rule governing class actions, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, came into
effect.33 The amendments add detail to the requirements for evaluating settlements in class action litigation, such as factors that courts

30

See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under
Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1685 (2008).
31
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015, 1195 (1982); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role
of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1724 (2004) (noting that the 1988
changes to the Act “were designed to open [the process] up to more and more
diverse points of view, make it more transparent, and diminish the need for
congressional involvement . . . .”).
32
Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 34
(1910).
33
JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, H.R. DOC. NO. 115-119, at 30 (2018).
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should consider in deciding whether settlements are “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”34 In attempts to mitigate unwanted practices,35
judges are now required to review any agreement—even oral agreements36—made in connection with the settlement.37 Because of various unique concerns, judges of the Advisory Committee spent years
trying to formulate rules for judicial review of class action settlement agreements before the 2018 revisions took effect.38 In particular, the early work of the Advisory Committee focused on getting

34

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). For those unfamiliar with class actions, the notion of
having to receive court approval of settlement agreements should seem strange.
In the normal course, settlements represent private contracts between plaintiffs
and defendants to end disputes. See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 17, at 37. Courts
whole-heartedly encourage settlements, and may even sanction parties who turn
down reasonable offers to settle. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (regarding pretrial
conference to facilitate settlement); see also Moffitt, supra note 12, at 1240. Settling a class action lawsuit, however, is not a simple transaction between plaintiffs
and defendants. A class action lawsuit binds those with claims even if they were
absent from the proceedings. Consequently, federal rules require a judge to hold
a hearing to review the terms of the settlement. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
35
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Oritz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1926–27 (2002)
(arguing that the incentive structure for settling class action litigation has the potential to illicit collusive practices or distorted behavior among self-interested
lawyers in the market for the final disposition of grievances); Samuel Issacharoff,
Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337,
386 (1999) (arguing that plaintiffs’ lawyers may sell out their clients’ claims in
exchange for large contingency fees); John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action
Rule 23 - What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 356 (2005); Bowling
v. Pfizer, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1261, 1277–79 (S.D. Ohio 1996); Erichson, supra
note 26, at 960 (arguing that defendants’ lawyers negotiating a settlement for a
class action that has not yet been certified can search for the lawyer offering the
least for her client, constituting a reverse auction of the plaintiffs’ claims).
36
Rabiej, supra note 35, at 377.
37
Specifically, courts are now required to examine whether class counsel adequately represented the class, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(A), whether the agreement
was negotiated at arm’s length, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(B), the methods for processing claims and distributing the settlement, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(ii), attorney’s fees, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iii), and the treatment of class members
relative to each other, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(D).
38
See generally Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement
Class Actions, the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545 (2006) (discussing the nature of the
class action litigation process prior to 2018).

2022]

MANAGING MASS TORT CLASS ACTIONS

99

specific language in the rules to assist with the certification of “settlement class actions”—class actions that are brought to the court
for certification at the same time as the request to approve the settlement.39
Like any good story or screenplay, the Advisory Committee’s
work on fairness hearings and class action settlements can be recounted in three acts, correlating to three rule amendments published for public comment and subsequently promulgated in 1998,40
2003,41 and 2018.42 Part II, Act One of our story, examines the work
of the Advisory Committee beginning in 1991 through to publication and promulgation of rule reforms in 1998. This first act also
introduces the notion of proximate politics43 by examining competition between judges of the Advisory Committee and the Supreme
Court. Part III, Act Two of our story, examines the work of the Advisory Committee through to 2003, focusing on competition between Congress and the Judicial Conference for the authority to control when, where, and how class actions are heard.
In Part IV, the final act, all facets of the story’s conflict are
brought to bear on the judges of the Advisory Committee as they
contend with a Supreme Court fully intent on limiting the reach of
class actions44 and a Congress intent on curtailing powers of the federal judiciary. As Part IV demonstrates, judges achieved a final but
partial success in their efforts to reform the rules of civil procedure
to reflect the growing prominence of pre-litigation settlements in
mass tort class actions. This nearly thirty-year saga, replete with
contest and competition for the power to set rules for litigation, evidences a different kind of judicial politics, one that ought to be no
less concerning merely because it happens outside of the courtroom.

39

Id. at 546; Rabiej, supra note 35, at 360–63.
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 523 U.S. 1221, 1221–
22 (1997).
41
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 538 U.S. 1083 (2002).
42
John G. Roberts, Jr., Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv18_5924.pdf. Amendments that became effective in 2007 and 2009 did
not relate to fairness hearings and thus they will not be examined in this article.
43
Halliday, supra note 25, at 337.
44
Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of
the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1261 (2017).
40
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I.
RETHINKING JUDICIAL POLITICS
Judges’ lawmaking and court-related activities are not restricted
to the courtroom. In addition to hearing cases, judges work to develop procedures through rules committees, by attending conferences and holding periods for public notice and comment.45 Much
of the work on judicial administration and court reform happens outside of the courtroom, behind the scenes in meetings, through reports or commissions, outside of the normal places we expect judges
to do their work.46 The outcomes of these rulemaking activities
shape the structure of dispute resolution, influencing the way that
facts, cases, and legal actors are processed through the legal system.
Even where court opinions appear to be dramatic rulings on rules of
procedure, they are often a culmination of “a world of practice”47
both in and out of the courtroom.
There are therefore at least three deficiencies with extant judicial
politics scholarship, which will be briefly expounded upon in this
part. First, extant judicial behavior literature rests on a narrow view
of judicial functions and judicial power.48 If there are other sites of
judicial lawmaking that happen outside of the courtroom, it follows
that there may be other sites of judicial politics, other places where
judges are letting non-legal factors influence their lawmaking endeavors. Second, the identification of conservative versus liberal
politics that form the basis for judicial politics scholarship does not
fit well with the interests at stake in class action and aggregate litigation.49 Finally, judicial behavior literature scrutinizes only one site
of competition—between the court and the other branches of government.50 This case study evidences other types of interests and
politics at play. These competitions and contestations, however,
should be no less concerning to those who strive to achieve a “pure”
legal system that operates solely on the basis of legal factors.
45

See discussion in Sections V, VI, and VII; see also Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery
“Reform,” 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 197–201 (2001).
46
Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
918, 919 (1995).
47
Id. at 925.
48
See, e.g. Epstein & Knight, supra note 2, at 11.
49
But see Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1526 (2017).
50
Yeazell, supra note 28, at 229.
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A. Other Sites of Judicial Lawmaking
Since the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act in 1934,51 U.S.
federal judges have had the power to make “prospective, legislationlike rules”52 for procedures controlling civil litigation in federal
court.53 Judges are restricted from effecting or modifying substantive rights but are able to prescribe “general rules of practice and
procedure.”54 In 1958, Congress amended the Rules Enabling Act,
delegating to the Judicial Conference the ongoing responsibility to

51

Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 49, at 1545–46.
53
Alexander Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1955) (discussing how the act delegates
authority to the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for district courts relating to “the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in
civil actions . . . .”).
54
Authority for Promulgation of Rules, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988). This article does not consider the legality or constitutionality of judicial rulemaking. On
that issue, see Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, supra note 31, at 1115
(noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has never satisfactorily explained . . . the place
of court rulemaking in our constitutional framework” and that early cases discussing the sources and limits of rulemaking power “set a pattern of ambiguity that
has not been departed from.”); A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision,
107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9–15 (1958) (arguing that “no constitutional scheme which
accepts judicial rule-making can be evolved rationally” without a range of issues
including “uncertainty” in terms of application, an inability of courts to exercise
their power, and an inability of courts to utilize techniques such as public hearings
that involve interested parties in the development of law); Charles E. Clark, The
Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 250,
257 (1963) (promoting Justice Black’s philosophy of procedural rules in terms of
its principal function to “serve as useful guides to help, not cluster, persons who
have a legal right to bring their problems before the courts.”); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1677, 1735–39 (2004) (“[R]ulemakers have, by and large, taken seriously
the Chief Justice’s assurance to Congress that they would observe the Enabling
Act’s limitations . . . . The result of the judiciary’s self-restraint is likely to be few
occasions of friction when the Court promulgates, and few overrides of, proposed
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the future. But that same self-restraint, coupled with the discovery of the power of procedure by interest groups and Congress
alike, seems destined to yield more proposals for ‘procedural’ legislation and
hence the need for closer and more frequent cooperation with Congress.”).
52
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study “the operation and effect”55 of the rules. Further amendments
to the Rules Enabling Act in 1988 formalized the rulemaking process, requiring rules committees to provide a period of notice and
comment before rules could be officially promulgated.56 Meanwhile, under the tenures of Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist,
judges have come to dominate the main rulemaking bodies.57 While
the initial Advisory Committee of the 1930s “did not include even
one sitting judge,”58 since the 1980s, current key committees consist
55

Congress enacted Section 331 of Title 28 of the United States Code. Governance & the Judicial Conference, Pub. L. No. 85-514, 28 U.S.C. § 331
(amended 1958).
56
This effectively transformed the reform process into the agency-like rulemaking that exists under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Yeazell, supra
note 28 at 247 (Regarding the 1988 revisions, Yeazell writes, “Most notably, these
changes gave Congress and the public more time to decide what they thought of
proposed rules and more information on which to base such a decision. Subsections (c) and (d) of 28 U.S.C. § 2073 regulate the consultative process preceding
presentation of a proposed Rule to the Supreme Court. The statutory hallmarks
are notice, an opportunity for public comment, and an explanation of recommendations, including dissenting views. In other words, the rulemaking process itself
has become proceduralized. The obvious model was administrative rulemaking,
and the statute roughly approximates that model.”). See also Geyh, supra note 20,
at 1241 (“[W]hen the judiciary is acting as a rulemaker, it has more the look and
feel of an administrative agency than a private lobbyist. That has led some scholars . . . to borrow from administrative law in search of solutions to the judiciary's
rulemaking woes.”); Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, supra note 31, at
1193 (“[M]ost suggestions for reform [of the Rules Enabling Act] have concentrated on process. In this, would-be reformers have followed, often without acknowledging it, the path of administrative law.”).
57
Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Rights and Retrenchment in the
Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 48 (2018) (“[U]nder Chief Justice Warren
Burger and his successors, all of whom were appointed by Republican presidents,
the Advisory Committee came to be dominated by federal judges appointed by
Republican presidents and, among its practitioner members, by corporate lawyers.”).
58
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 49, at 1587; see also Yeazell, supra note
28, at 237–38 (“Lawyer participation has declined as that of judges increased.
Today, lawyers comprise just a bit more than a third of the members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules . . . . By 1985, the proportion had dropped to about
twenty-five percent; over the last few years it has hovered between thirty-three
and forty percent. The Committee that submitted the most recent proposed
changes in the Rules of Civil Procedure consisted of fourteen members, five of
whom were practicing lawyers-if one includes the Assistant Attorney General of
the Civil Division in this category. Seven are judges-six of these from the federal
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of a majority of judge members with judges acting as the chair of
these committees as well.59
Notwithstanding this and other instances of judges’ non-caserelated law reform work,60 judicial politics scholarship continues to
replay the Legal Realist moment of the early twentieth century,61
courts and one from a state court. The remaining two members are legal academics.”).
59
The current Advisory Committee roster (effective to September 30, 2020)
includes the Honorable John D. Bates, United States District Court for the District
of Columbia as Chair, plus eight other judges, five lawyers, and three professors
(two of whom act as reporters). RULES COMM., COMMITTEE ROSTER (2020).
60
See generally William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three
Branches: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power Struggles, 26 J.L. & POL. 305 (2011)
(discussing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984); Gregory Hansel, Extreme Litigation: An Interview with Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges, Chairman of the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 19 ME. B.J. 16 (2004) (discussing the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation); Amy J. Cohen, Trauma and the Welfare State:
A Genealogy of Prostitution Courts in New York City, 95 TEX. L. REV. 915 (2017)
(discussing “problem-solving” courts that “reflected and reinforced an ethos of
individual, rather than social, responsibility that was transforming state welfare at
the time into more market-inflected and minimalist governance programs.”); Jamie Rowen, Worthy of Justice: A Veterans Treatment Court in Practice 42 L. &
POL’Y 78 (2020) (discussing Veteran Treatment Courts).
61
For classic examples of Legal Realist scholarship, see Roscoe Pound, The
Call for a Realist Jurisprudence 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 701–08 (1931) (listing
the five most pronounced ideals of current juristic realism); Karl N. Llewellyn, A
Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 453–54 (1930)
(“[A] realistic approach would . . . put forward two suggestions on the making of
such categories. The first of them rests primarily upon the knowledge that to classify is to disturb . . . . For this reason a realistic approach to any new problem
would begin by skepticism as to the adequacy of the received categories for ordering the phenomena effectively toward a solution of the new problem . . . . The
other suggestion of a realistic approach rests on the observation that categories
and concepts, once formulated and once they have entered into thought processes,
tend to take on an appearance of solidity, reality and inherent value which has no
foundation in experience.”); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—
Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1228–33 (1931) (summarizing Dean Pound’s main findings regarding his indictment of “new legal realists”);
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 824 (1935) (arguing that the “functional method,” when
applied to the sciences, “has justified itself in every scientific field to which it has
been actually applied,” and that functional redefinition of scientific concepts “has
been the keynote of most significant theoretical advances in the sciences during
the last half century.”); Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part One: The Effect
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targeting judges’ role as adjudicators at trials and appeals. Yet the
concern of the Legal Realists—that judges were deciding cases
based on political preferences rather than on purely legal factors—
does not abate merely because the place of lawmaking has
changed.62 The existence of a written decision should not be the factor that determines whether action is scrutinized and assessed. It behooves scholars to expand our understanding of the judicial function
so that we have the opportunity to debate the norms and principles
that guide judges in their reform work.
Viewed a different way, the power expressed through judicial
decision making is the power to compel63—the power judges have
to directly control the behavior of others through their declarations
of winners and losers. However, the singular focus on compulsory
power limits our understanding of other sources of power and places
where judges participate in public affairs. In addition to their access
to compulsory power, judges also have access to institutional and
productive power through the law’s more indirect and diffused
mechanisms for exerting power and constituting social relations.64
Through their institutional power, judges can exercise “indirect control over the conditions of action of socially distant others.”65 How

on Legal Thinking of the Assumption That Judges Behave Like Human Beings, 80
U. PA. L. REV. 17, 17–18 (1931) (“[I]f [lawyers and law teachers] would go into
court and look at what was going on, they would see that the primary business of
courts was to render specific decisions (i.e., specific judgments, orders and decrees); that law meant such specific decisions in concrete cases, not so-called legal
rules and principles.”).
62
See Yeazell, supra note 28, at 240; see generally Stempel, supra note 20
(discussing the etiology and controversy of the scope amendment).
63
Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall, Power in International Politics, 59
INT’L ORG. 39, 51–52 (2005).
64
Id. at 48 (“Those examining concrete institutions have shown how evolving rules and decision-making procedures can shape outcomes in ways that favor
some groups over others; these effects can operate over time and at a distance,
and often in ways that were not intended or anticipated by the architects of the
institution. Similarly, scholars influenced by poststructuralism examine how historically and contingently produced discourses shape the subjectivities of actors;
the very reason for genealogical and discourse-analytic methods is to demonstrate
how systems of knowledge and discursive practices produce subjects through social relations that are quite indirect, socially diffuse, and temporally distant.”).
65
Id.
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exactly? At least one instantiation of judges’ institutional power resides in their authority to set the rules for how the case unfolds before them.66
Why does judges’ other work matter? Even though scholars tend
to denigrate legal procedure as mundane or disconnected from the
progressive potential of substantive law,67 the history and current
application of class action procedure is very much tied to the furtherance of equity and social justice outcomes. While a detailed description of the effect of procedure on substantive rights is beyond
the scope of this Article,68 it should suffice to note that historical
accounts of the movement to make legal procedure trans-substantive
and less technical was about protecting substantive outcomes and

66

Subrin & Main, supra note 20, at 1843-46.
See Erik S. Knutsen et al. 2013. The Teaching of Procedure Across Common Law Systems, 51 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1, 15, 28 (2013) (noting that in Canada,
“there are only a small number of full-time academics who identify themselves as
having a special research interest in civil procedure. Even fewer identify themselves as proceduralists” and in Australia “some law schools believed that civil
procedure was insufficiently academic to justify being required for the law degree.”). See also Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, supra note 31, at 1189
(“A number of commentators have argued that impact on rights claimed under the
substantive law is or should be a central concern under the [Rules Enabling]
Act.”).
68
See, e.g., Subrin & Main, supra note 20, at 1853–56 (“Procedure is power,
of course, so the stakes of choosing one over the other produces different winners
and losers.”); Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1463, 1472 (1987) (“It is true that procedural rules are never neutral in their effects, if not their purposes. It is also likely that there has been more systematic
misrepresentation about the value-free nature of procedural rules than about any
other category in the traditional lexicon.”); Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219, 2219–20 (1989) (noting the important political implications of legal procedure despite its reputation as neutral and apolitical); Tobias
Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1027, 1027 (2013) (arguing that the bifurcation of procedural versus substantive law “has obscured the dynamic nature of the relationship that frequently
exists between the mechanisms of litigation and the underlying substantive law.”);
Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 720 (1975) (“Federal Rule 23 presents a procedural possibility which, once present, cannot help but shape and articulate substantive
law.”).
67
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rights.69 Moreover, early amendments to the class action rule reflected the Advisory Committee’s interest in supporting civil rights
cases and providing access to courts as “part of the nation’s growing
commitment to social justice under the Constitution.”70 Litigants
have since used class action settlement procedures to address suspected injuries from silicone gel-filled breast implants,71 cancer
caused by exposure to asbestos,72 Native American land claims,73
racial discrimination in the administration of federal farm loan programs,74 and concussion-related football injuries.75
Holtzoff, supra note 53, at 1058–59 (arguing that the drafters sought “to
strik[e] down the ancient shackles that bound legal procedure to a remote past”
and “bring about the disposition of every case on the merits”); Harold Hongju
Koh, The Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Every Action?, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 1525, 1527 (2014) (“[T]he new rules were an attempt to make the
requirements for going to court consist of simple, nontechnical language, designed to lower barriers to accessing courts and “promote adjudication on the merits.”); Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1906
(1989) (“The drafters’ commitment was to a civil practice in which all parties
would have ready access to the courts and to relevant information, a practice in
which the merits would be reached promptly and decided fairly.”); Stephen M.
Subrin, Introduction, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1874–75 (1989); Carrington, supra
note 25, at 617 (arguing that the new rules sought to “focus the courts’ attention
more on effective law enforcement and less on the intricacies of procedures . . . .”).
70
Arthur Miller, The American Class Action: From Birth to Maturity, 19
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1, 6 (2018). But see Arthur R. Miller, What Are Courts For?
Have We Forsaken the Procedural Gold Standard?, 78 LA. L. REV. 739, 761–762
(2018) [hereinafter Miller, What Are Courts For?] (questioning the utility of the
class action mechanism for advancing social justice claims).
71
In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp.), 887 F. Supp 1469 (1995) (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
72
Judge Weiner of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had at one time
125,000 Asbestos cases before him. See Gregory Hansal, Extreme Litigation: An
Interview with Judge WM Terrell Hodges, Chairman of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, 19 ME. BAR J. 16, 20 (2004); Stephen Labaton, Judges
Struggle to Control a Caseload Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1991, at E4.
73
Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
74
Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The settlement,
which provided cash payments and debt relief for approximately 20,000 farmers,
totaled $2.3 billion. Id.
75
Initially started as a class action, concussion-related claims are now being
resolved through multidistrict litigation. See In re National Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, 962 F.3d 94, 95 (3d Cir. 2020).
69
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To be clear, judges’ work with the Advisory Committee represents only a small portion of the work that judges do on rules committees.76 Rule 23(e), which addresses the procedure for settling
class actions, textually, represents less than one percent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, settlement class actions
present a unique and difficult challenge for courts77 and, in the case
of mass torts where injuries are connected to public incidents like
the Exxon Valdez oil spill,78 judicial review represents an important
moment for the legal system to ensure justice is being done.79
76

See How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. Courts,
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works (last visited Sept. 17, 2022).
77
See generally Erichson, supra note 26, at 951 (arguing that because plaintiffs do not yet have a certified class, there is an incentive for defendant’s counsel
to shop around for a plaintiff’s lawyer willing to agree to a reduced settlement
amount); Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87
GEO. L.J. 1983, 2001–04 (1998-1999) (discussing the “special concerns” pertaining to settlement class actions that are not present in ordinary class actions); John
C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM L. REV. 1343, 1366–67 (1995) (noting potential for collusion between
plaintiff and defendant counsel); Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel Issacharoff, The
Participatory Class Action, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846, 847–48 (2017) (“[Amchem
and Ortiz] rejected any easy application of the class action mechanism to the complete resolution of mass harm cases that could not be folded into traditional class
action criteria. [They] ushered in a wave of new mechanisms designed to deal
with the complications of consensual settlement through Rule 23.”); Macey &
Miller, supra note 26, at 200 (discussing some of the issues arising from the fact
that when presenting the settlement to the court, the plaintiffs and defense are no
longer adversaries; as such, the court can no longer rely on adversarial parties to
discover and present information).
78
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, (2008) (awarding the plaintiff
class $2.5 billion).
79
Judith Resnik, Reorienting the Process Due: Using Jurisdiction to Forge
Post-Settlement Relationships Among Litigants, Courts and the Public in Class
and Other Aggregate Litigation, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1017, 1059 (2017). Additionally, the monetary amounts tied to class action settlements can be quite large. See
EMORY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION
FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM PHASE
TWO’S PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS 3, 6 (2008),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/preliminary_findings_from_phase_two_class_action_fairness_study_2008_1.pdf (reporting average settlement amounts at 9.5 million for all class settlements, where one-third
involved tort, personal injury, and property damage cases); see also Emory G. Lee
III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the
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B. Conflicting Interests in Settling Aggregate Claims
A second deficiency of judicial politics literature reflects the
unique nature of aggregate litigation. On the surface, the political
issues in class actions and mass tort litigation seem to align with the
standard conservative-liberal, left-right policy debates. On the right,
private individual control over adjudication—including the ability
to settle—yields faster, cheaper, more efficient results.80 On the left,
privatized dispute resolution threatens public deliberation over
shared norms and values.81 Nevertheless, and notwithstanding numerous reproductions of these debates,82 the politics of mass tort
class action settlements is not straightforward as interests shift and
overlap depending on one’s vantage point. To demonstrate these
claims, I briefly unpack the political interests at stake below.
A first set of debates—within scholarship examining aggregated
and non-aggregated litigation—positions business interests and outof-court dispute resolution on the right side of the political spectrum.83 Negotiated settlements are said to protect business interests

Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1723, 1733–74 (2008) (noting that a self-assigned purpose of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 was to “provid[e] for Federal court consideration of
interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction.”).
80
See Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in
Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 689
(1997); Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law; the Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285, 294–97 (2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or “The
Law of ADR,” 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 22 (1991); see also Jonathan T. Molot,
An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L. J. 27, 113 (2003);
Subrin and Main, supra note 20, at 1869; John P. Frank, The Rules of Civil Procedure- Agenda for Reform, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1883, 1884 (1989).
81
See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–86
(1984); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO.
L.J. 2619, 2648–50 (1995); Resnik, supra note 12, at 1000.
82
See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Sharpening the Sword: Class Certification, Appellate Review, and the Role of the Fiduciary Judge in Class Action Lawsuits, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1042, 1067 (2004); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1428 (1995);
Moffitt, supra note 12, at 1203–04; Mullenix, supra note 26, at 531; Redish, supra
note 29, at 85.
83
See Galanter, supra note 80, at 287–91.
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and privatize rights.84 Moreover, the assertion that there is too much
litigation has been seen to be part of a calculated effort to discourage
the enforcement of expanded rights statutorily created during the
Civil Rights Era.85 Similarly, Owen Fiss, Judith Resnik,86 and other
scholars who have adopted this line of reasoning, argue that private
dispute resolution robs society of the opportunity to articulate shared
norms and values.87 Legal decisions do not just resolve disputes.
They provide society with a moment to reflect on and recommit to
values we collectively deem important. Both arguments lead to the
conclusion that those left of center want trials, whereas “efficiency”
is a code word for doing away with substantive rights.88
When it comes to aggregate litigation, however, the tables turn.
Social justice advocates want aggregated claims because they allow
plaintiffs to assert small claims where they would not otherwise
have incentive to launch expensive litigation.89 In contrast, corpo-

84

See Mullenix, supra note 26, at 554; Judith Resnik, The Privatization of
Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at
75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1819 (2014).
85
Galanter, supra note 80, at 289; Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline
of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1271–74 (2005); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 80, at 30; David Marcus, The History of the Modern
Class Action, Part II: Litigation and Legitimacy, 1981–1994, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1785, 1812–14 (2018).
86
Judith Resnik has on multiple occasions delved into the issues raised by a
lack of public involvement as a result of privatized procedures in contemporary
litigation. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 46, at 939–40; Resnik, supra note 79, at
1815; Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Experiences and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L.J.
1631, 1636 (2015).
87
Fiss, supra note 81, at 1083–86; Mullenix, supra note 26, at 563–64.
88
On the other hand, liberal-minded plaintiff advocates should not want trials
because repeat players do better at trial than one-time individual claimants. See
Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 119–22 (1974).
89
Summary of Comments and Testimony, Agenda Item 4-B, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Apr. 25-26, 2017 at 133 [hereinafter Agenda Book, Apr. 2017] (“Public Justice believes that class actions are one
of the most powerful tools for victims of corporate and governmental misconduct
to seek and achieve justice.”); see also David Marcus, The Short Life and Long
Afterlife of the Mass Tort Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1565, 1574 (2017)
(social justice advocates prefer the class action mechanism to individual litigation,
even in circumstances where plaintiffs win large awards if defendants choose
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rate defendants and those situated on the conservative end of the political spectrum prefer individualized litigation, because small
awards may discourage plaintiffs from pursuing their grievances,90
but also based on an interest in individual autonomy and control of
the litigation process.91
The tables turn again when speaking of settling aggregated litigation. Social justice advocates want aggregated settlements.92 Especially if the rules allowed for the criteria for settlement to be more
relaxed than when certifying for litigation purposes, settling could
avoid the difficulties of finding common issues or injuries in large,
amorphous class actions.93 On the other hand, plaintiffs do not benefit from settlements resulting from collusive behavior among plaintiff and defendant attorneys, which feature large attorney’s fees and
relatively small awards for class members.94 Defendants also want
aggregated settlements. Whether speaking of global settlements in
multidistrict litigation or settling class action litigation in mass tort
cases, most scholars believe that corporate commercial defendants
will favor settlements because they provide predictability and finality to claims.95 On the other hand, defendants may have an interest
bankruptcy over further litigation); Miller, What Are Courts For?, supra note 70,
at 754–55.
90
Mini Conference on Class Actions, Agenda Item 6-B, Meeting of Advisory
Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Nov. 5-6, 2015, at 179 [hereinafter
Agenda Book, Nov. 2015] (summarizing comments of a defense-side lawyer who
expressed concerns that class actions “exert huge leverage for compromise from
defendants that have a strong basis for resisting claims on the merits.”).
91
Resnik, supra note 46, at 923.
92
Agenda Book, Nov. 2015, supra note 90, at 179–82 (summarizing comments of a plaintiff-side lawyer who expressed strong support for the settlement
class idea); see also Rabiej, supra note 35, at 367 (“Class-action specialists supported the amendments, which facilitated the use of the class-action device.”).
93
See, e.g., Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345–46 (2011).
94
Coffee, supra note 82, at 1349; Redish & Kastanek, supra note 38, at 547.
For a discussion of collusion in the context of multi-district litigation, see
ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM BARGAINING IN
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 10–11 (2019).
95
See Coffee, supra note 82, at 1373–75; Richard Marcus, Revolution v. Evolution in Class Action Reform, 96 N.C. L. REV. 903, 916–17 (2018); Issacharoff
& Nagareda, supra note 30, at 1651. On the other hand, defense side lawyers have
expressed concerns about easing class certification criteria for settlement purposes
because it adds pressure to settle. See, e.g., Agenda Book, Nov. 2015, supra note
90, at 179.
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in greater scrutiny of class action settlements, which would make it
more difficult for plaintiff attorneys to bring unformed claims to
court.96
By way of example of the ill-fitting confines of judicial behavior
literature, take the Supreme Court’s decision in Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor.97 Presumably, if defendants prefer global settlements that bind future plaintiffs no matter the extent of their injuries,
then the decision should have been a victory for the plaintiffs. Writing the decision affirming the Third Circuit’s decision to vacate the
District Court’s order approving the settlement was Justice Ginsburg.98 However, joining her in the majority decision were Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter
and Justice Thomas.99 Moreover, denying certification for the class
action did not mean that all of the claims were magically addressed
individually. By the end of 2009, over fifty-thousand federal asbestos cases were still pending before the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.100 Meanwhile, one of the largest
asbestos manufacturers was able to circumvent the entire process by
filing in Chapter 11 bankruptcy and by paying claims at a fraction
of their value.101 While it may be the case that defendants benefit
from global settlements, so too do plaintiffs, especially when their
interests are considered relative to their BATNA, where in some
cases, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement is no compensation at all.102
Fairness hearings to review settlement agreements in class action litigation further challenge standard classifications. The fairness
hearing consists of an open, public hearing to review the details of
96

Coffee, supra note 82, at 1373–75.
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 591 (1997).
98
Id.
99
Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court’s next decision on settlement class actions
for asbestos related injuries, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 820 (1999),
was written by Justice Souter, with Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joining.
100
Bookman & Noll, supra note 28 at 771.
101
Id. at 771–72.
102
See generally Leigh L. Thompson et al., Negotiation, 61 ANN. REV. PSYCH.
491, 494–95 (2010) BATNA stands for the “best alternative to a negotiated agreement.” (“When one’s BATNA is better than an agreement one can reach with a
particular negotiation counterpart, one should choose not to agree and exercise
the BATNA instead.”).
97

112

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:88

an otherwise private settlement.103 Absent class members become
the public as the judge strives to protect the public interest reviewing
the settlement for fairness and adequacy.104 Moreover, concerns
about privatized justice do not readily apply. Settlements are part of
the court record and their review is part of an open hearing that accommodates public objectors.105
C. Other Types of Politics
The third and final deficiency of extant judicial politics scholarship is that it does little to address the various kinds of contestations
for power or the multiple and possibly conflicting incentives that
judges have in their different roles.106 Owen Fiss once wrote that the
appropriateness of a passive role for the judiciary might be put into
question by “inequalities in the distribution of resources.”107 Fiss
was concerned about the dynamic between the individual and “large
aggregations of power,” and the mechanisms available to the judiciary to provide support in ways that gave meaning to public values.108
Similarly, instead of only being concerned about how judicial interventions reflect liberal or conservative ideologies, it is prudent to
examine other “aggregations of power” effecting the legal system109
and whether public values are impacted as a result.
103

See William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1437 n.7 (2006).
104
See Molot, supra note 80, at 52–53; Tobias Barrington Wolff, Discretion
in Class Certification, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1897, 1899 (2014).
105
A 2004 study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center of close to 300,000
civil cases in 52 districts indicated that very few cases had sealed settlement agreements (0.44%). Of the 1,270 cases with sealed settlement agreements, class action
settlements only represented six percent of those agreements (0.026% or 76 cases
in a survey of a total of close to three hundred thousand cases). See Summary of
Sealed Settlement Agreements in Federal District Court, Agenda Item 6, Meeting
of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Oct. 28-29, 2004, at 250 [hereinafter
Agenda Book, Oct. 2004].
106
See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 67; RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES
THINK 11–14 (2010); Stempel, supra note 45, at 247–48 (arguing that members
of the Advisory and Standing Committees may bring pre-existing political and
ideological preferences to their work in rulemaking).
107
Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24 (1979).
108
Id. at 43–44.
109
Burbank & Silberman, supra note 80, at 699 (“The most important developments in civil justice . . . have concerned power: who has it and who should
have it, both in litigation and in making the rules for litigation.”).
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These other aggregations of power can be seen in the competition between trial and appellate courts for importance and relevancy,110 as well as in inefficient organizational behaviors that produce incentives for promotion and the accumulation of personal
power.111 For instance, one potential site of struggle resides in trial
versus appellate courts’ competing interests for the final word.112
Procedures that emphasize pre-trial motions and negotiated settlements influence the ability of courts to finish cases without a final
disposition.113 Because pre-trial rulings are usually not subject to
appeal, the authority to control and manage the litigation process
shifts to trial level judges. Similarly, cases that settle “guarantee that
appellate courts will play no role in the suit . . . . Judicially encouraged settlement, to the extent that it succeeds, thus extends the reach
of trial court power.”114 An additional source of competition, which
forms the focus of this Article, resides in the struggles between rules
committees and Congress, or between judges of the rules committee
and judges of the Supreme Court, regarding whom has the power to
authoritatively articulate the rules.115
With this expanded understanding of judicial politics, the remainder of this Article examines the Advisory Committee’s efforts
to draft a rule addressing settlement class actions. Again, I do not
assess the normative value of easing certification criteria for settlement class actions. Instead, I describe the work of the Advisory
Committee, its goals, accomplishments and failures, as well as the
sources of conflict within and outside of the Judicial Conference.
110
See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 5 (arguing that judges, as participants
in a labor market, are motivated by nonpecuniary incentives including “esteem,
influence, self-expression, celebrity (that is, being a public figure), and opportunities for appointment to a higher court . . . .”); see also Stephen C. Yeazell, The
Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631,
631, 641 (1994).
111
See Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and
Pathologies of International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 699–700 (1999).
112
See Yeazell, supra note 110, at 642.
113
See id. at 647.
114
Id. at 656.
115
Burbank & Farhang, supra note 49, at 1550, 1593–94 (both procedural and
substantive-law changes contributed to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure becoming “a site of struggle and contest by interest groups, legislators, rulemakers,
and judges who seek to control the procedural playing field on which private enforcement proceeds . . . .”).
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II.

POLITICS IN RULEMAKING ACT ONE: SCOTUS WINS A
BATTLE
Robert McKee and the late Syd Field are famous for delineating
the structural elements required for successful Hollywood screenplays.116 According to these “screenwriting gurus,”117 a screenplay’s
Act One should introduce the audience to the protagonist’s world
and present the protagonist—here, the Advisory Committee and the
judges who serve as committee members—with an initial challenge
or call to action.118 Often this challenge, which the protagonist fails
at first, is repeated as the final confrontation in the climax.119 By the
end of the story, the protagonist, having endured multiple tests and
challenges, finally prevails.120
In our Act One, judges of the Advisory Committee set out to
create rules to help judges manage settlement approval—or “fairness hearings”—in class action litigation.121 The Advisory Committee was particularly interested in delineating what information lawyers would need to present when requesting certification at the same
time as bringing a settlement agreement to the judge for her review.122 The Advisory Committee made bold recommendations, including a recommendation to revise Rule 23 so that judges could
grant certification for the purposes of settling the class action, even
if certification criteria might not be met if the matter proceeded to
trial.123 The Advisory Committee did not succeed in this first attempt, revisiting the matter as the final challenge in Act Three of the
committee’s rulemaking saga (this Article’s Part IV).124 Act One
116
Robert McKee even features as a character and the subject of light teasing
in the 2002 satire, Adaptation, directed by Spike Jonze. ADAPTATION (Columbia
Pictures 2002).
117
Syd Field, ‘Screenwriting Guru’, Dies Aged 77, BBC (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-24987804.
118
See SYD FIELD, SCREENPLAY: THE FOUNDATIONS OF SCREENWRITING 23
(rev. ed., 2005).
119
See id. at 25.
120
See id. at 25–26.
121
See generally William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial
and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1435, 1435 (2006); DEBORAH R.
HENSLER ET. AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 2000).
122
See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 49, at 1499–5000.
123
See discussion infra Section II.B, footnotes 163-67.
124
See discussion infra Section IV.B.
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tells the story of the Advisory Committee’s initial call to action and
its quest for a prominent place for settlements in the class action
regime. This first act also demonstrates the proximate politics of
rulemaking.
A. But First . . . A Prologue
In literature, an author might write a prologue to set up the story
and provide the reader with context or other background information
about important events or actions that took place before the start of
the story. In our drama, several prior events bear mentioning. The
development of fairness hearings implicates several histories including the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the evolution of “settlement class actions,”125 and the expansion of court-connected ADR and judge-led settlements.126
Focusing here on making rules of civil procedure, the prologue
to our story starts in 1938, when Equity Rule 38,127 which allowed
for class actions, was carried over as Rule 23 in the new Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The new class action rule continued the
equity practice of categorizing class actions as either “pure, hybrid,
or spurious.”128 In a functionalist, realist vein, mid-twentieth century
scholars argued that categorizing class actions was confusing and a
vestige of technical rules that “distract[ed] attention from the real
issues.”129 The first major revision to class action rules thus took
place in 1966, when Rule 23 was “amended to ‘open the courthouse

125
See Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionary Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 964, 966 (1995).
126
See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 80, at 695. Equity Rule 38, which
allowed for class actions, was carried over and expanded as Rule 23 in the first
trans-substantive iteration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Holtzoff,
supra note 53, at 1070.
127
Equity Rule 38 of 1912 stated: “When the question is one of common or
general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend
for the whole.” Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights:
Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 669 n.24
(1979).
128
Holtzoff, supra note 53, at 1070.
129
Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 381
(1967).
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door’ to people whose individual stakes were too small to make litigation economically rational.’”130 The 1966 amendments also clarified that dismissing a class action required court approval and notice to class members of any proposed settlement or “compromise.”131
In the fifteen to twenty years surrounding the 1966 amendments,
new federal legislation created substantive rights—including the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1968, the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
and the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act of 1976—bolstering the number of claims that could be made using the class procedure.132 Meanwhile, tort litigation on product liability, occupational
health, and environmental disasters expanded.133 Asbestos litigation
was “a public health calamity of major proportions.”134 Millions of
workers in the U.S. were exposed to asbestos, several hundred thousand died from exposure, and many more suffered from exposurerelated illnesses.135 Many of these tort cases proceeded through class
action litigation.136
130

Burbank & Silberman, supra note 80, at 684; see Frank, supra note 66, at

1884.
131

See Miller, supra note 127, at 669, 680.
See Mullenix, supra note 26, at 518 n.27, 519 (“Between 1966 and the mid1970s, federal courts were transformed by the influx of massive class action cases
seeking remediation for alleged violations of various constitutional, federal, and
state laws.”); see also Weinstein, supra note 69, at 1912; Miller, supra note 127,
at 670–71.
133
See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 1015
(1993); Mullenix, supra note 26, at 521; Schuck, supra note 125, at 947 (arguing
that mass tort litigation arose both because of exposure to toxic substances, as
well as mass manufacturing and distribution capabilities). But see Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1618 (2004)
(“Work accidents, followed by the early mass disasters and then automobile accidents each provided a new stage on which repeat players emerged to manage the
resolution of personal injury disputes.”).
134
Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 133, at 1619.
135
Id.
136
For instance, Chief Judge Robert Parker certified a class action related to
asbestos litigation. Cimino v. Raymark Industries, 751 F. Supp. 649, 652 (E.D.
Tex. 1990). Parker presided over a 133-day trial. Id. at 653. The corresponding
docket sheet was 529 pages, with 25,348 pages of transcript and 373 court orders.
Id; see also THOMAS E. WILLGING, APPENDIX C: MASS TORTS PROBLEMS &
132
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In response to the increased attention on mass torts,137 Chief Justice Rehnquist commissioned an ad hoc committee in 1990 to study
the particular problems raised by asbestos litigation.138 Based on the
ad hoc committee’s recommendations, the Judicial Conference
asked the Standing Committee to direct the Advisory Committee to
study Rule 23 to discern whether it could accommodate the burdens
of mass tort litigation.139 And so begins our tale.
B. Early Attempts to Address Settlement Class Actions
Rule 23 officially made it back onto the Advisory Committee’s
agenda in February 1991, when the Advisory Committee reviewed
a draft of an amended rule suggested by the Asbestos Task Force
and American Bar Association Litigation Section.140 At that time,
the rule as it stood for “dismissal” of a class action simply stated:
“A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court . . . .”141
When new members—including Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham
of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as Chair142—joined the

PROPOSALS: A REPORT TO THE MASS TORTS WORKING GROUP 37 (1999),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/masstapc_1.pdf.
137
See Memorandum to Members of the Standing Committee and Civil Rules
Advisory Committee and Introduction to Advisory Committee’s Working Papers
Collected in Connection with Proposed Changes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (Class Actions), Agenda Item III, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, May 12, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Agenda Book, May 1997] (“Intentionally or not, we may
be coming to rely on civil litigation not only for individualized dispute resolution,
but also, through the class action device, to bring about changes in the safety of
products . . . and in, the method for compensating broad segments of society affected by singular torts. Indeed, in a few instances, Congress has passed legislation relying on class action procedures.”).
138
Marcus, supra note 89 at 1583; Marcus, supra note 95, at 907.
139
Marcus, supra note 95, at 907.
140
Minutes, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Feb. 21-23,
1991, at 8.
141
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), 28 U.S.C.A. (as amended Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1,
1987).
142
The Hon. Patrick Higginbotham, ST. MARY’S UNIV. SCH. LAW,
https://law.stmarytx.edu/academics/faculty/patrick-higginbotham/ (last visited
Sept. 18, 2022). Judge Higginbotham was nominated to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas by Republican President Gerald Ford in
1975. Patrick Higginbotham, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Patrick_Hig-
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Advisory Committee in 1993, the committee invited class action experts to present on the latest issues.143 John Paul Frank, a lawyer
who sat on the Advisory Committee during the pivotal 1966 reforms, presented on the problems of requesting certification and approval of settlement at the same time, including collusion between
lawyers and competition between rival class actions.144 Frank noted
that the requirement in Rule 23(c)(1) that a decision on class certification be made “as soon as practicable” was not being followed as
lawyers worked toward presenting the class and settlement offer as
a package.145 As to using the class action mechanism to address
mass torts,146 Frank stated that “a significant part of the pressure to
do something about Rule 23 arises from the impulse to have judges
take more and more control of cases.”147
The Advisory Committee admitted that some of the problems
might be more appropriate for a legislative solution and in 1994,
decided that it needed further information.148 The Advisory Committee opted to form a Rule 23 Subcommittee that would work with

ginbotham/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2022). He was elevated to the Fifth Circuit appellate court in 1982, nominated by Ronald Reagan. Id. Judge Higginbotham was
appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist to act as chair of the Advisory Committee
from 1993-1996. The Hon. Patrick Higginbotham, ST. MARY’S UNIV. SCH. LAW,
https://law.stmarytx.edu/academics/faculty/patrick-higginbotham/ (last visited
Sept. 18, 2022).
143
Minutes, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Apr. 28-29,
1994, at 17 [hereinafter Minutes Apr. 1994].
144
Id. at 16. “At an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a
class representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
145
Minutes Apr. 1994, supra note 143, at 17.
146
While recognizing that “[s]omeway, somehow, we must have a way to dispose of mass disputes,” Frank asserted (and continued to assert for the next several
years) that Rule 23 was not meant to deal with mass torts. Minutes Apr. 1994,
supra note 143, at 18; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to the
1966 revisions (“A ‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous persons is
ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions . . . would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways.”).
147
Minutes Apr. 1994, supra note 143, at 16.
148
Id. at 16, 21. Issues such as multidistrict consolidation and jurisdictional
limits on diversity classes were felt to “lie beyond the reach of the Rules Enabling
process.” Id. at 20.
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the Federal Judicial Center.149 By the mid 1990s, the Federal Judicial Center reported that in four districts that were part of its empirical study,150 thirty-nine percent of the cases certified for class action
were certified “for settlement purposes only.”151 In eighteen percent
of certified class actions, the proposed settlement “was submitted to
the court before or simultaneously with the first motion to certify.”152 In twenty-four of those twenty-eight cases, “the court approved the settlement without changes.”153
Because of the persistent appearance of “settlement class actions”—those actions where the proposed settlement is brought to
the court at the same time as the request for certification—the Advisory Committee turned its attention to specifying the judge’s role
in assessing settlements.154 Various circuit courts had approached
settlement class actions differently.155 Some felt that because a settlement agreement would relieve the court of the obligation to conduct a trial, the criteria normally required to certify a class action
might be relaxed. For instance, in Weinberger v. Kendrick,156 a securities class action, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
noted that it had “long recognized that a district court’s disposition
of a proposed class action settlement should be accorded considerable deference.”157 Similarly, in an antitrust case before the Fifth Circuit, the court made note of the “general consideration that courts

149

Id. at 21.
THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN
FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON
CIVIL
RULES
7
(1996),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rule23_1.pdf. The four federal district courts were: the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania; the Southern District of Florida; the Northern District of Illinois;
and the Northern District of California. Id. at 4.
151
Id. at 35.
152
Id.
153
Id. This was not a historical anomaly. In 2008, the Federal Judicial Center
reported that tort claims comprised one third of all diversity class actions (contract
and consumer protection claims were the majority of claims by number of lawsuits filed) and that of the cases not remanded to state court or voluntarily dismissed, nearly thirty percent settled. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 79, at 3.
154
WILLGING ET AL., supra note 150, at 65.
155
See id. at 34–35.
156
Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982).
157
Id. at 73.
150
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favor settlement,”158 and moreover that mechanisms to encourage
settlement classes “are favored when there is little or no likelihood
of abuse, and the settlement is fair and reasonable and under the
scrutiny of the trial judge.”159
Other circuits took a more formal literal approach, finding that
the rules as they appeared in the Federal Rules had to be applied in
every instance without compromise.160 The circuit court in Amchem,
for example, recognized the immense burden asbestos litigation had
put on the federal court system, and that the proposed settlement
represented “a brilliant partial solution to the scourge of asbestos
that has heretofore defied global management in any venue.”161
Nevertheless, allowing a court to certify a class for the purposes of
settlement when that same group could not be certified for litigation
would exceed the language of the rules of procedure and cause “a
serious rend in the garment of the federal judiciary that would result
from the Court, even with the noblest motives, exercising power that
it lacks.”162
In response, the Advisory Committee crafted a draft amendment
that would have ended the controversy by explicitly allowing approval of a class “for purposes of settlement, even though the requirements . . . might not be met for purposes of trial.”163 The Advisory Committee’s proposed new rule would relax the criteria for certification where the parties request certification and approval of a
settlement at the same time.164 The requirements for class certifica-

158

In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 174 (5th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 174.
160
See Georgine v. Amchem Prod., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), rev’d
sub. nom. Amchem Prods. Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
161
Georgine, 83 F.3d at 617 (Particularly because the settlement agreement
bound potential future claimants, e.g. individuals who had been exposed to asbestos but whose injuries had not yet manifested).
162
Id. at 618.
163
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON CIVIL RULES 37 (May 17, 1996) [hereinafter May 1996 Report].
164
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIV. RULES, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, VOLS. 1-4 (1997) [hereinafter WORKING
PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMM.]. As Judge Niemeyer candidly wrote in the
Advisory Committee’s May 1997 report to the Standing Committee, the addition
159
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tion would have to be met, but the amendment authorized “evaluation of these prerequisites and requirements from the perspective of
settlement.”165 The Advisory Committee also proposed amendments
to subdivision (e) “to confirm the common understanding that a
hearing must be held as part of the process” of approving the settlement.166
The text of these aspects of the proposed rule read:
(B) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be
maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: . . . (4)
the parties to a settlement request certification under
subdivision (b)(3) for purposes of settlement, even
though the requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might
not be met for purposes of trial.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall
not be dismissed or compromised without hearing
and the approval of the court, after notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise has been given to all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs.167
In doing this early work to address settlement class actions, the
Advisory Committee met at the Administrative Offices of the U.S.
Courts in Washington, D.C. as well as at law schools.168Additionally, it met at resorts across the U.S., such as the five star Stein
of a new Rule 23(b)(4) was made to overrule a specific contrary ruling rendered
by the Third Circuit in an opinion that also recognized the possibility that Rule 23
might be amended in this respect. See id. at 47 (“[T]he Committee’s presentation
suggests that all Rule 23(b)(4) does is reinstate the law as it existed prior to two
decisions by the Third Circuit: Georgine and In re General Motors Pick-Up Truck
Fuel Tank Litigation.”).
165
May 1996 Report, supra note 163, at 36.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 37–38. While listed as a “type” of class action, the Advisory Committee explained, “Although subdivision (b)(4) is formally separate, any class certified under its terms is a (b)(3) class with all the incidents of a (b)(3) class, including the subdivision (c)(2) rights to notice and to request exclusion from the
class.” WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 164, at 153.
168
In 1995, as it neared publishing new rules, the Advisory Committee held
meetings in conjunction with conferences at New York University School of Law,
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Eriksen Lodge in Park City, Utah, and the Cloister Sea Island on the
Southeastern coast of Georgia.169 Based on the information available,170 Rule 23 was on the agenda of every meeting during this period, with the Committee devoting an average of 54 pages to the
discussion of Rule 23.171
However, judges of the Advisory Committee may have traversed too far into the highest Court’s territory when they indicated
that their proposed amendments were intended to resolve the disagreement among the circuit courts.172 The Advisory Committee’s
proposed Notes, which follow the recitation of the rules and which
are included in most published sources of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, stated the following regarding the role settlements
should have in the consideration of class certification: “Many courts
have adopted the practice reflected in this new provision, some very

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, and University of Alabama School
of Law. See Samuel Estreicher, Federal Class Actions After 30 Years, 71 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 1 (1996); Edward Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 13 (1996). See WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY
COMM., supra note 164, at ix.
169
Between 1991 and 1998, on average, twenty-two people, including an average of nine judges, attended the Advisory Committee meetings with the highest
attendance at thirty-nine and smallest at thirteen people. On the number of people
at the meetings, thirteen people attended the February 1992 meeting of the Advisory Committee. See Minutes, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
Feb. 21, 1992, at 1. Thirty-nine attended the meeting of the Advisory Committee
held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on February 16 and 17, 1995.
See WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 164, at 195. On the
locations, see Draft Minutes, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Mar
16-17, 1998, at 37 (Utah) and WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMM., supra
note 164, at 179 (Georgia).
170
Agenda books are only available starting in 1992, and three agenda
books for meetings in 1994 and 1995 are not accessible through the U.S.
Courts online archive. See Agenda Books, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-rules-committees/agendabooks?committee=All&year%5Bvalue%5D&order=field_date_updated&sort=asc (last visited Sept. 17, 2022) (showing that the first available electronic agenda book is from November 1992).
171
See Proposed Amendments to Rule 23, Agenda Item VI, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Nov. 9-11, 1995 [hereinafter Agenda Book, Nov.
1995]. For instance, for the November 1995 meeting, discussion of Rule 23 comprised 130 pages of the agenda.
172
See May 1996 Report, supra note 163, at 42.
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recent decisions have stated that a class cannot be certified for settlement purposes unless the same class would be certified for trial
purposes. This amendment is designed to resolve this newly apparent disagreement.”173
C. Plot Point: SCOTUS Grants Certiorari for Amchem
In May 1996, the Third Circuit released its decision in Georgine
v. Amchem Products, Inc.174 The court characterized the issues as no
less than “forc[ing] the judicial system to choose between forging a
solution to a major social problem on the one hand, and preserving
its institutional values on the other.”175 The proposed settlement
sought to address asbestos-related claims of up to two million individuals against twenty companies.176 The Third Circuit called the
settlement proposal “a brilliant partial solution to the scourge of asbestos that has heretofore defied global management.”177 Nevertheless, the court sent the case back to the district court for decertification because it found that the class certification requirements were
not met.178
In its decision, the Third Circuit made specific reference to the
work of the Advisory Committee to address mass tort claims.179 The
court opined that creating reduced requirements for settlements in
mass tort cases was properly the role of Congress, but it also could
fall under the purview of the Advisory Committee.180 The court
wrote:
Another route would be an amendment to the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. We are aware that the
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules is in fact studying Rule 23, including the matter of settlement classes. One approach the Rules
173

Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
Georgine v. Amchem Prod., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 615 (3d Cir. 1996), rev’d
sub. nom. Amchem Prods. Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
175
Id. at 617.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 635.
179
See id. at 627 (citing the Advisory Committee’s notes to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3)).
180
See id. at 634.
174
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Committee might pursue would be to amend Rule 23
to provide that settlement classes need not meet the
requirements of litigation classes.181
In the normal course when rule changes are underway, the
Standing Committee of the Judicial Conference (the top of the committee hierarchy) reviews proposed rule changes and decides
whether the proposed amendments merit publication.182 Once
amendments are published, they are subject to formal notice and
comment, following which the rules are transmitted to the U.S. Supreme Court, which has the option to submit or withhold amendments to Congress for its enactment.183 In this case, on November 1,
1996, approximately three months after publication of the proposed
amendments to Rule 23—after the Standing Committee had decided
that the amendments merited publication—the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to the defendants in Amchem.184
The Supreme Court had not previously expressed interest in tortrelated class action settlements, and granting certiorari in this case
likely caught the judges of the Advisory Committee by surprise.185
In the thirty years prior to these events—including following the
1966 amendments—the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of settlements in class actions twenty-two times, but only twice for tortrelated settlements.186
181

Id. at 617.
U.S.
Cts.,
How
the
Rulemaking
Process
Works,
https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference
(last visited Sept. 13, 2022).
183
Id.
184
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997). But see Marcus, supra note 89, at 1575–89 (discussing Amchem and its attempt to use class
action to settle claims of future claimants).
185
Judge Paul Niemeyer of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, who took over as chair of the Advisory Committee in October 1996, aptly
stated the committee’s position: “I believe it is wise to defer any action on settlement classes until the Committee has the benefit of the Supreme Court’s anticipated opinion in this case.” WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMM., supra
note 164, at 838.
186
A Westlaw search on settlement class actions pre-Amchem (search for settlement, certification, and Rule 23) yielded twelve cases from the Supreme Court
in the twenty years prior to Amchem. See also HENSLER ET AL., supra note 29, at
36 (noting Amchem was the Supreme Court’s first look at a mass tort class action).
182
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The Advisory Committee still carried on with the three public
hearings that had previously been scheduled for Philadelphia (November 1996), Dallas (December 1996), and San Francisco (January
1997).187 It heard from eighty-five members of the public, including,
for example, Professor Judith Resnik, who attended the first hearing
in Philadelphia and testified to the importance of judges’ role in reviewing settlements and bringing private dispute resolution into
public spaces for review and comment.188 In addition to public hearings, the process provided for a period of public comment, with written comments on the proposed amendments due by February 15,
1997.189
The Supreme Court’s actions to interrupt the rulemaking process
exhibits what Paul Carrington, reporter for the Advisory Committee
from 1985-1992, called “dissatisfaction with [the Court’s] modest
share of the power to make procedural law.”190 The 1988 reforms to
the Rules Enabling Act denoted a move toward a more democratic
and “process-based account of the rule of law.”191 Procedural rulemaking is now required to be deliberative, participatory, inclusive,
and transparent.192 For example, the rulemaking process incorpo-

187

See PHILADELPHIA HEARING TRANSCRIPT, WORKING PAPERS OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL
RULE 23, VOL. 3 (1997), at 4–5 [hereinafter Philadelphia Hearing Transcript]
(discussing plan to hold hearings in Philadelphia, Dallas, and San Francisco).
188
See id. at 121–23 (“Rule 23 has a potential virtue . . . a virtue of structure
and a role for judges and litigants and pushing them to the visible arena.”).
189
Id. at 6.
190
Carrington, supra note 25, at 599. Carrington notes that Justice Scalia in
particular was averse to relying on Committee Notes for uncovering the purpose
of procedural rules, notwithstanding their scrutiny via the same public, deliberative process as the rules themselves. See id. at 620. Kevin Clermont and Stephen
Yeazell tell a similar story of the Supreme Court’s capture of the rulemaking process in the pleadings cases Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen
C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 823
(2010) (“The bone this Article picks with the Court is . . . that by blazing a new
and unclear path alone and without adequate warning or thought it left the pleading system in shambles.”).
191
Bookman & Noll, supra note 28, at 767.
192
See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 189, at 846–47 (providing an opportunity for a “thorough airing of the choices” is the preferable process for amending
rules of procedure); see also Bookman & Noll, supra note 28, at 780 (discussing
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rates notice not merely that the rules may be changed—which effectively is what the legal community gets with a granting of certiorari—but also for publication of proposed new rules.193 The process
includes a period of public comment and democratic deliberation,
and has a built-in mechanism for review by providing what is effectively a veto power to the Supreme Court and Congress.194 Yet, the
Supreme Court was not content to leave rulemaking to the committee process, notwithstanding the expertise,195 amount of time, research, and the number of people who had been involved in working
on the rule amendments.196

how the Enabling Act model of procedural design emphasizes procedural fairness
because it provides legitimacy to legal judgments); Resnik, supra note 86, at
1644–47.
193
How
the
Rulemaking
Process
Works,
U.S.
CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works (last visited Sept. 19, 2022).
194
See Carrington, supra note 25, at 657. Moreover, there may be good reason
to leave rulemaking to the “experts”—judges and lawyers with trial experience—
as the composition of the Supreme Court does not always include former trial
judges. See Clermont & Yeazell supra note 189, at 851.
195
See Bookman & Noll, supra note 28, at 777; see also A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem
in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1958) (describing the Court’s
expertise in rulemaking over Congress); Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 189, at
850–51 (2010) (noting the lack of experience of Justices on the Supreme Court
with litigation procedure).
196
The Advisory Committee met fifteen times between February 1991 and
April 1996. In addition to the required period of notice and comment, the Advisory Committee sought feedback from the legal community before proposed
amendments were officially published. The Advisory Committee met with members of the Standing Committee, law professors, lawyers from Attorney Generals’
offices, the American College of Trial Lawyers and the ABA Litigation Section,
and with researchers from the Federal Judicial Centre. Transcripts of the three
official public hearings comprise 762 pages. See WORKING PAPERS OF THE
ADVISORY COMM., supra note 164, at Vol. 3.; COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 306 (2002),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST9-2002.pdf
(“Judge
Higginbotham pioneered the investigatory model that the Committee continues to
use to good effect whenever it considers a complex issue. The model combines
multiple informal opportunities for involvement by judges, interested academics,
members of the bar, and bar organizations, with targeted empirical work.”); see
also Rabiej, supra note 35, at 349 (explaining how Judge Higginbotham had the
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Comparative law scholar, Mitchel Lasser, has examined institutional competition in the context of French and European high courts
vying for the authority to control jurisprudence on “fundamental
rights.”197 There, multiple courts engaged in “a complex and highly
charged set of interactions” for control of institutional power.198
French and European judiciaries were cognizant of “powerful pressures” to engage in fundamental rights discourse and thus even
courts which had not previously undertaken judicial review of legislative action were forced into “a mad scramble to master and direct
the development of fundamental rights jurisprudence” or risk being
“left intellectually and institutionally behind.”199 Lasser presents a
complex picture of “highly charged” institutional competition between courts, manifesting as proximate politics within the judicial
system.200
Here, too, in the case of judges’ authority to craft rules of procedure, the timing and course of events suggests internal competition
between judges at the different levels of courts. This case seems to
indicate that, as with European judges, the judges of the U.S. Supreme Court were not content to let others direct the development
of a complex and controversial area of law.201 As between the Supreme Court’s unfettered discretion to comment on the state of the
law and lower court judges’ authority to craft rules under the Rules
Enabling Act, our Act One suggests that judges of the Supreme
Court would prefer to vest power in themselves.202

committee meet with the nation’s foremost class action and mass torts attorneys
and judges to understand the reality of complex litigation).
197
Mitchel de S.-O.-l’E. Lasser, The Judicial Dynamics of the French and
European Fundamental Rights Revolution, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS:
JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 289–310 (Diana Kapiszewski et al. eds.,
2013) (explaining how, in the French and European judicial systems, a “whole
series of courts” which had not previously undertaken judicial review of legislative action were forced into “a mad scramble to master and direct the development
of fundamental rights jurisprudence.”).
198
Id. at 291.
199
Id. at 289–90.
200
Id. at 291.
201
See generally id. at 289.
202
Carrington, supra note 25, at 621 (“The Supreme Court has on several occasions chosen to disregard the text of the Civil Rules, the advice of those engaged
in the rulemaking process, and even the text of the Constitution . . . .”).
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In June 1997, the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit
opinion, agreeing that the plaintiffs did not meet the threshold requirements for certification.203 Justice Ginsburg did note that suggested reforms had been published for comment and that “voluminous public comments”204 were made in response. Justice Ginsburg
curiously noted that the Advisory Committee had “not yet acted on
the matter,” and then went on to state, “[w]e granted review to decide the role settlement may play, under existing Rule 23, in determining the propriety of class certification.”205
After seven years of deliberation, the Advisory Committee recommended one amendment to Rule 23 for the Judicial Conference’s
approval.206 The amendment did not touch upon the issue of settlements. Settlements, the particulars of fairness hearings, and their effect on class certification would have to wait until another day.207
III.
ACT TWO: CONFRONTATIONS WITH CONGRESS
As with any proper second act, our Act Two both begins and
ends with the same conflict—confrontations between Congress and
the Advisory Committee over the control of the rulemaking process.208 In this act, judges of the Advisory Committee confronted the
issue of judicial independence, risking at least the perception that
judges are separate and removed from Congress.209 We expect the
judiciary to be impartial in respect of any dispute before them.210
Consequently, judges must not be influenced by the other branches

203

See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997).
Id. at 619.
205
Id.
206
New Rule 23(f) to allow for interlocutory appeals. Rabiej, supra note 35,
at 349–50.
207
Judge Niemeyer’s final word on the matter was to create a Mass Torts subcommittee and publish four huge volumes—the smallest is 734 pages—of archival material documenting the Advisory Committee’s work on class actions.
See WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 164.
208
For a discussion of conflicts between Congress and the Judicial Conference
in other contexts, see Yeazell, supra note 28, at 229.
209
See id. (noting that judges began drafting initial versions of the rules, moving away from their original roles as arbiter of the fairness of the rules).
210
See id. at 239.
204
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of government, and for the sake of the legitimacy of judicial institutions, must also appear to be at arm’s length from the executive
branch and legislature.211 The public’s perception of an independent
judiciary is threatened when judges are seen to be lobbying House
representatives and Senate members and wrangling with the different branches of government over who has authority to make rules
for federal courts.212
A. First Confrontation: Interlocutory Appeals
Shortly after Judge Paul Niemeyer took over as chair of the Advisory Committee in 1996,213 House Representative Henry J. Hyde
(R-IL) introduced a bill that would authorize interlocutory appeals
of decisions regarding class certification.214 Yet, new Rule 23(f),
which allowed for permissive interlocutory appeals of class certification orders, was the only proposal that the Advisory Committee
was able to introduce following the 1996 notice and comment period
that was otherwise derailed by Amchem and then Ortiz.215 While
new Rule 23(f) was proceeding through the Rules Enabling Act process, Congress decided that it was in the best position to address the
211

See id.
See id. at 239–41.
213
Judge Paul V. Niemeyer was appointed to the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland in 1987 by President Ronald Regan and was elevated
to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 1990 by George H.W. Bush.
Judge Niemeyer has dissented from several key decisions conferring or upholding
rights of LGBTQ+ individuals. Judge Niemeyer also dissented from the Fourth
Circuit’s en banc decision to uphold the lower court’s injunction against President
Trump’s 2017 travel ban in International Refugee Assistance Project, Inc. v.
Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017). Judge Niemeyer chaired the Advisory Committee from October 1996 through to October 2000.
214
Judicial Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1997); see Admin.
Off. of the U.S. Cts. Off. of Pub. Affs., Leadership Speaks Out on Judicial Issues,
29 THIRD BRANCH 1, 1–3 (1997) [hereinafter Leadership Speaks Out on Judicial
Issues]. Exceptions to the rule forbidding interlocutory appeals are listed in 28
U.S. Code § 1292 (Supp. 1992). H.R. 1252 proposed several reforms, such as allowing parties in civil litigation to remove an assigned judge as of right and requiring that a complaint made under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act be
referred to a different circuit. Id. at 3–4.
215
See Rabiej, supra note 35, at 360 (noting that the committee waited to see
whether the Supreme Court’s handling of Amchem and Ortiz affected its decisionmaking); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 820 (1999), rev’d 134 F.3d 668
(5th Cir. 1998).
212
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issue of interlocutory appeals as part of its reasoned response to specific instances of judicial abuse and “‘activist’ judges who overstepped their judicial bounds.”216 The division between the purview
of Congress and that of the judiciary is meant to be clear under the
Rules Enabling Act.217 Nevertheless, sponsor Representative Hyde
described his bill as reforming “the procedures of the federal courts
to ensure fairness in the hearing of cases . . . [and] assure that litigants in federal courts will be entitled to fair rules of practice and
procedure leading to the due process of their claims.”218
In response, Judge Niemeyer wrote to Senators Hatch and Leahy
to ask that they oppose the bill pending in the Senate.219 Judge Niemeyer and Judge Anthony J. Scirica220 also testified before congressional committees.221 On their experiences, Judge Niemeyer politely
reflected, “Bills to amend procedural rules directly seem to be introduced with greater frequency. Often the bills are introduced because
Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts. Off. of Pub. Affs., House Passes “Judicial
Activism” Bill, 30 THIRD BRANCH 1, 1–2 (1998); see also Admin. Off. of the U.S.
Cts. Off. of Pub. Affs., End of the 105th Congress Resolves Legislative Action, 30
THIRD BRANCH 1, 2-3 (1998) (regarding Senate’s “judicial activism” bill, Senate
Bill S. 2163); Burbank & Farhang, supra note 49, at 1507 (noting that between
1973 and 2014, Congress introduced sixty-eight bills aimed at “restrict[ing] opportunities and incentives for class actions.”).
217
See NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 84 (2007).
218
Leadership Speaks Out on Judicial Issues, supra note 214, at 2; see also
Judicial Reform Act, H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1998) (the house passed the Judicial Reform Act, H.R. 1252 on April 23, 1998, while the Senate considered a
stand-alone bill addressing interlocutory appeals).
219
Draft Minutes of June 18-19, 1998 Meeting, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Nov. 12-13, 1998, at 4 [hereinafter Agenda Book, Nov.
1998].
220
Judge of the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and Chief Judge
from 2003 to 2010. Judge Scirica was a member of the Advisory Committee from
1993-1998. He served as chair for both the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
Working Group on Mass Torts and for the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. In 2008, Judge Scirica was named Chair of the Executive
Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States. He is also a former
member of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Anthony Scirica, PENN
CAREY LAW, https://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/ascirica/ (last visited Oct. 12,
2022); Debra Cassens Weiss, 3rd Circuit’s Judge to Chair Federal Courts’ Executive Committee, ABAJOURNAL, (Apr. 25, 2008, 3:09PM) https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/3rd_circuits_chief_judge_to_chair_federal_courts_executive_committee.
221
Agenda Book, Nov. 1998, supra note 219, at Agenda Item II, p.2.
216
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the sponsors do not know that the Enabling Act process can be invoked to pursue the same questions . . . .”222 Judge Scirica was less
sanguine. In January 1999, he relayed to the Standing Committee
that it was “very important for the rules committees to uphold the
integrity of the Rules Enabling Act and be vigilant against potential
violations”223 by Congress.
In reaction to their feedback, the Standing Committee briefly
flirted with the idea of shortening the rulemaking process, but any
proposal, such as shortening the time for public comment, faced
strong opposition.224 Committee members were also acutely aware
that it would be difficult to reduce the amount of time the Supreme
Court had to review proposed rule amendments.225 In the end, Committee members were able to persuade the relevant members of Congress to drop the issue of interlocutory appeals.226 The bill passed in
the House and was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, but went no further.227
B. Mass Torts Working Group
Meanwhile, in what may have been a concession to the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee following Amchem, Chief Justice
Rehnquist authorized the creation of a working group in February

222

Id.
JUD. CONF. COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., MINUTES COMMITTEE ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at 2 (Jan. 1999); see also Draft Minutes,
Agenda Item II, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Nov. 12-13,
1998, at 3 (intimating that Congress would act when the committee process was
ineffective: “There is some concern in Congress that the Advisory Committee has
devoted too much time to the questions raised by the bills without reaching any
final conclusion.”).
224
JUD. CONF. COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., supra note 223, at 20.
225
Draft Minutes, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Apr. 1920, 1999, at 20 [hereinafter Agenda Book, Apr. 1999].
226
Id. at 3 (“The sponsors were persuaded to amend the bills so that the effect
would be only to accelerate the effective date of the new Civil Rule 23(f) that the
Supreme Court sent to Congress last spring.”).
227
See Judicial Reform Act, H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1998), https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/house-bill/1252; Judicial Improvement Act, S.
2163, 105th Cong. (1998), https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/senatebill/2163.
223
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1998 to study mass torts for a one-year term.228 The controversy following the publication of the 1996 rules amendments convinced
members of other Judicial Conference Committees that the problems raised by mass tort litigation “cut across the jurisdictions and
interests of the committee structure.”229 The initial request to Chief
Justice Rehnquist was thus for the establishment of a formal task
force.230 Rehnquist’s response, however, was to authorize an informal working group to be led by the Advisory Committee.231 Chaired
by Judge Scirica, the working group held its first meeting in Washington, D.C. in 1998.232
By 1999, the working group had held four meetings, at UC Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco, at University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School in Philadelphia, and at the Administrative
Offices of the U.S. Courts in Washington, D.C.233 In total, the working group met with eighty-one conference participants, including attorneys, litigants, judges, and law professors.234 The working group
presented a final report, short titled Report on Mass Tort Litigation,235 to Chief Justice Rehnquist on February 15, 1999. By the time
of the Committee’s April meeting, however, the Chief Justice had

228

Agenda Book, Apr. 1999, supra note 225, at 9.
Agenda Book, Nov. 1998, supra note 219, at Agenda Item II, p.5; see also
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 90–91 (2008) (discussing the externalities of class actions); see Nagareda, supra note 217, at xi, xiv, xviii.
230
Agenda Book, Nov. 1998, supra note 219, at Agenda Item II, p.5.
231
Id.
232
CIV. RULES ADVISORY COMM., MINUTES CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, at 1, 3 (Mar. 1998). Members of the working group included Advisory Committee members Sheila Birnbaum (lawyer), Judge Lee H. Rosenthal of
the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, judges from the committees
for Bankruptcy Administration, Court Administration and Case Management,
Federal-State Jurisdiction, and Magistrate Judges, as well as the chair of the Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation. Id. at 1.
233
Id. at 3.
234
Agenda Book, April 1999, supra note 225, at 9.
235
CIV. RULES ADVISORY COMM., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RULES AND THE WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES (Feb. 15. 1999).
229
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not issued any response to the report, other than to allow the report
and appendices to be made public.236
Among the working group’s recommendations was another proposal for the creation of a Judicial Conference committee that would
focus exclusively on mass torts.237 This new committee would be
able to draw on the experience of members across the various advisory committees “in a project considering legislative as well as rulemaking solutions.”238 Nonetheless, the working group admitted that
creating a committee focused exclusively on mass torts would “interject the judiciary into a very controversial area,” and risk their
“becoming entangled with highly politicized matters” that could potentially “outweigh the opportunities for constructive contributions.”239
In March 1999, Congress attempted to legislate a solution to asbestos litigation with the Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of
1999 (S. 758) and the companion bill at the House of Representatives, the Asbestos Compensation Act of 2000 (H.R. 1283).240 These
reforms would have provided for an administrative solution to asbestos litigation by establishing a national claims facility to resolve
asbestos injury claims.241 The proposed legislation provided for an
administrative office that would be funded entirely by defendant
corporations and would have “help[ed] control excessive transaction
costs by capping attorneys’ fees expenses at 25% of the recovery.”242 Both bills died with the end of the 106th Congress.243

236
Draft Minutes of April 19-20, 1999 Meeting, Agenda Item II, Meeting of
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Oct. 14-15, 1999, at 1.
237
See Draft Minutes of October 14-15, 1999 Meeting, Agenda Item II, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Apr. 10-11 2000, at 4 [hereinafter
Agenda Book, Apr. 2000].
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Legislative Report, Agenda Item I-C, Meeting of Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, April 10-11, 2000, at 1-2.
241
Id. at 1.
242
Id.
243
See Asbestos Compensation Act of 2000, H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. (2000),
http://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-bill/1283 (showing that the
bill’s history stops after its introduction to the House in 1999); Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999, S. 758, 106th Cong. (1999), https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/senate-bill/758 (showing that the bill’s history
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In the end, all that the Mass Torts Working Group was able to
accomplish was to cultivate expertise for a reconstituted ad hoc
committee.244 By October 1999, Judge Niemeyer decided that it was
time to revisit Rule 23 and, to that end, authorized the creation of a
Rule 23 Subcommittee.245
C. Rule 23 Subcommittee Attempts to Address Forum
Shopping
The Rule 23 Subcommittee quickly went to work crafting proposals for rule changes.246 These proposed changes addressed judicial review of settlement agreements by introducing new Rule
23(e)(5), which included factors that a court would have to consider
when reviewing proposed settlements.247 Adapted from an opinion
penned by the Mass Tort Working Group Chair, Judge Scirica,248
these factors included “the probable time, duration, and cost of
trial . . . the maturity of the underlying substantive issues . . . the extent of participation in the settlement negotiations by class members
or class representatives, a judge, a magistrate judge, or a special
master . . . [and] the number and force of objections by class members.”249

stops after its introduction in the Senate in 1999). Both bills were introduced and
went no further.
244
The Rule 23 Subcommittee took members from the former Mass Torts
Working Group, including Judge Lee Rosenthal and lawyer Sheila Birnbaum. See
Agenda Book, Apr. 2000, supra note 237, at 4. The efforts of the Mass Torts
Working Group also prompted the Federal Judicial Centre to revise the Manual
for Complex Litigation. See Draft Minutes: Civil Rules Advisory Committee,
April 2000, Agenda Item II, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Oct.
16-17, 2000, at 2 [hereinafter Agenda Book, Oct. 2000].
245
See Agenda Book, Apr. 2000, Draft Minutes: Civil Rules Advisory Committee, October 14 and 15, 1999, supra note 237, at 4.
246
See Agenda Book, Apr. 2000, Draft Minutes: Rule 23 Subcommittee, February 18, 2000, supra note 237, at 10–14.
247
See id. at 10–11.
248
Compare Agenda Book, Oct. 2000, Review of Settlement: Revised Rule
23(e), supra note 244, at 39–40, with Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. Am., 148 F.3d
283, 316–24 (3d Cir. 1998).
249
Agenda Book, Oct. 2000, Review of Settlement: Revised Rule 23(e), supra
note 244, at 39. The draft rules also included opt-out provisions following notice
of the terms of settlement, appointment of class counsel and lawyers’ fees, and
additional appeal provisions. See id. at 39–40.
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The Rule 23 Subcommittee met in Washington D.C. (December
2000) and then in San Francisco (January 2001), where it met with
five class action experts.250 Following these meetings, the subcommittee made substantial changes to its proposals, which it then presented to the Advisory Committee at an unusual additional March
meeting, added so that the subcommittee could receive additional
feedback and still submit proposals to the Standing Committee for
the June 2001 deadline.251 The list of factors that was previously
delineated in Rule 23(e)(5) was removed and included in the Committee Notes section instead.252 What remained in terms of guidance
to judges was “an explicit standard of review: the settlement must
be “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”253
In its package of amendments submitted to the Standing Committee in May 2001, the Advisory Committee proffered a different
Rule 23(e)(5), this time to address the problem of duplicative and
competing class actions.254 Under this set of reforms, a refusal to
approve a settlement would preclude “approving substantially the
same settlement… unless changed circumstances present new issues as to the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement.”255 Combined with draft Rule 23(c)(1)(D)—precluding other
courts from certifying a class that a federal court has refused to
certify—and Rule 23(g)256—which gave federal courts the option
See Reporter’s Notes, Rule 23 Subcommittee, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Mar. 12, 2001, at 76, 100 [hereinafter Agenda Book, Mar.
2001].
251
See id. at 100.
252
See Agenda Book, Mar. 2001, Proposed Rule 23(e), supra note 250, at 29–
30. The March amendment package also included a revision to Rule 23(c)(1),
which designates the timing for seeking class certification. See Agenda Book,
Mar. 2001, Memorandum: Feb. 26, 2001, supra note 250, at 4–5. The revisions
changed the language in the rule from “as soon as practicable” to “when practicable,” which the Subcommittee felt would bring the language of the rule in line
with practice. See id. at 4.
253
Agenda Book, Mar. 2001, Memorandum: Feb. 26, 2001, supra note 250, at
6.
254
CIV. RULES ADVISORY COMM., REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, May 14, 2001, at 48.
255
Id.
256
The proposed text read:
(g) Related class actions (1) When a person sues or is sued as
a representative of a class, the court may—before deciding
whether to certify a class or after certifying a class—enter an
250
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of issuing an order prohibiting other courts from certifying a substantially similar class—this set of rules gave district courts the institutional authority to control the conditions of forum shopping.
These reforms, of course, touched directly on Congress’s repeated attempts to introduce legislation allowing class actions to be
removed from state court and litigated in federal court.257 Judges
were far from oblivious to Congress’s work on these issues, being
particularly concerned about the potential for increased workloads.258 In a memo regarding the Judicial Conference’s authority
under the Rules Enabling Act, the Subcommittee wrote:
One response to these concerns is reflected in various
bills framing federal legislation to deal with class actions in state courts. Legislative approaches to these
problems are welcome. Great care will be required,
however, to avoid the temptation to legislate in terms

order directed to any member of the proposed or certified class
that prohibits filing or pursuing a class action in any other
court . . . In entering an order under this Rule 23(g)(1) the cout
must make findings that
(A) the other litigation will interfere with the court’s ability to
achieve the purposes of the class litigation,
(B) the order is necessary to protect against interference by
other litigation, and
(C) the need to protect against interference by other litigation is
greater than the class member’s need to pursue other litigation.
(2) In lieu of an order under Rule 23(g)(1), the court may stay
its own proceedings to coordinate with proceedings in another
court, and may defer the decision whether to certify a class notwithstanding Rule 23(c)(1)(A).
(3) The court may consult with other courts, state or federal, in
determining whether to enter an order under Rule 23 (g)(1) or
(2).
Id. at 57.
257
See, e.g., S. 248, 106th Cong. (1999), introduced by Senator Hatch on January 19, 1999; S. 353, 106th Cong. (1999), introduced by Senator Grassley on
February 3, 1999; in the House: H.R. 967, 106th Cong. (1999), introduced by
House member Sensenbrenner on March 3, 1999.
258
See COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., SUMMARY REP. OF JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, 27 (2002) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REP., 2002].
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that sweep too much into federal courts without adequate opportunity for case-specific adjustment of the
relationships between federal and state courts.259
D. Final Act Two Confrontation: The Class Action Fairness
Act
The Advisory Committee published its Rule 23 reform package
in August 2001.260 Following this, the Advisory Committee held a
conference at the University of Chicago Law School, plus two public hearings at which the committee heard from over forty witnesses.261 Feedback from the Chicago meeting as well as from an
informal call indicated that the Enabling Act likely did not provide
authority for the rule changes that the Advisory Committee proposed.262 The Advisory Committee unanimously decided not to proceed on any of the suggested revisions targeting federal versus state
jurisdiction.263 The Committee also deleted Judge Scirica’s list of
factors for settlement review from the Committee Notes section.264
In its report to the Standing Committee, the Advisory Committee included an eighteen-page memo explaining the history of the
Advisory Committee’s work and the problem of overlapping class
actions.265 Here and elsewhere, the Advisory Committee went to
pains to stress that their reforms “address the process for managing
a class action” rather than the “prerequisites or criteria for certification.”266 Presumably a focus on process distinguished this later work
from the 1996 reform package.

259

See Agenda Book, Mar. 2001, Memorandum: Enabling Act Authority for
Addressing Overlapping Class Actions, supra note 250, at 61.
260
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REP., 2002, supra note 258, at 8.
261
See id. The committee also provided for an informal process for providing
public comment directly on the issue of overlapping and competing class actions.
See CIV. RULES ADVISORY COMM., MINUTES CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE 12 (Jan. 22-23, 2002).
262
See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REP., 2002, supra note 258, at 315.
263
Id.
264
See id. at 104.
265
See id at 302.
266
Id. at 2.
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As to duplicative class actions, by 2002, the Advisory Committee was recommending a congressional solution to forum shopping.267 Even though diverting class actions could increase the federal judiciary’s workload, additional control of class action litigation
meant that federal judges would have more authority in articulating
the law. As the Advisory Committee wrote, allowing federal courts
to hear large multi-state class actions would “further the important
principle that in a federal system, no one state’s courts should make
decisions that are binding nationwide even as to class members who
were not injured in the forum state.”268
In December 2003, the revised rules for Rule 23(c), (e), (g), and
(h) came into effect, including the specific direction that a hearing
must be held to review a proposed settlement, and that the court must
find that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”269 Left to
its own devices, Congress finally passed the Class Action Fairness
Act270 in 2005 (“CAFA”) after a “long and messy legislative process.”271
IV.
ACT THREE: RETURN OF THE SETTLEMENT CLASS
In screenplays, act three presents the climax—the “fullest and
furthest expression of the story’s central conflict and the ultimate
proof of the truth that underlies the story.”272 In our Act Three,
judges of the Advisory Committee face their final battles, taking on
Congress and the Supreme Court in a final and somewhat successful
effort to reform the rules of civil procedure to reflect the growing
267

See id. at 301.
Id. But see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A
Tale of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1584–86 (2008) (arguing
that judges found ways to resist the implementation or extension of the Class Action Fairness Act).
269
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C) (2003).
270
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, and 1711–1715 became law on February 18,
2005. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–
1715 (2005).
271
Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical
Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1444 (2008); see also
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old
and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1823
(2008).
272
AMNON BUCHBINDER, THE WAY OF THE SCREENWRITER 95–96 (2005).
268
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prominence of pre-litigation settlements in mass tort class actions.
If there is any “truth” to this story, it might be as follows: First, the
work of the Advisory Committee is not merely a technical legal exercise but rather is fraught with competition for the exercise of authority.273 Second, contrary to the literature that posits judges as rational, strategic, policy preferencing individuals, viewed over the
twenty-seven year period that it took to stake a claim for settlement
class actions, the Advisory Committee’s work presents as inefficient
and irrational, especially in light of the movement of mass tort litigation to Multidistrict Litigation proceedings.274 Nonetheless, after
nearly thirty years of work on fairness hearings and Rule 23(e),
judges of the Advisory Committee demarcated a place for settlement
class actions in the reforms to the rules promulgated in 2018.275
A. Settlement Class Actions . . . Again?
Rule 23 made its way back onto the agenda at the November
2011 meeting of the Advisory Committee, under the heading: “Class
Actions: Again?”276 The memo to reintroduce Rule 23 to committee
273
See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil
Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 530 (2001) (discussing politics involved in amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26 regulating
discovery).
274
See id. at 87–88; Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More:
MDL’s Roots as a Class Action Alternative, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1711 (2017); Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves” on Your Side:
A Defense of Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation, 108 GEO. L. J. 73, 75
(2019); Zachary D. Clopton, MDL as Category, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1297, 1298
(2020); Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave, MDL in the States, 115 NW. U.
L. REV. 1649, 1649 (2021); BURCH, supra note 94, at 9; Eldon E. Fallon et al.,
Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2324–25
(2008); Mullenix, supra note 26, at 511. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret
S. Williams, Perceptions of Justice in Multidistrict Litigation: Voices from the
Crowd, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming).
275
Multidistrict Litig. Subcommittee: Subcommittee Report, Agenda Item 8,
Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Oct. 16, 2020, at 161.
276
Should Class Actions Be Brought Back to the Agenda?, Agenda Item IX,
Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Nov. 7-8, 2011, at 1 [hereinafter
Agenda Book, Nov. 2011]. In posing this question, the Advisory Committee commented on the amount of time the committee had previously spent looking at the
subject of class actions. The title also inauspiciously references the U.S. Supreme
Court’s negative treatment of mass tort class actions. Why continue to work on
Rule 23 to address class actions when the court continues to dismiss class actions
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members stated that several factors prompted the Advisory Committee’s renewed attention, including, firstly, the Supreme Court’s erroneous decisions in several class action cases.277 These cases included, most prominently, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v.
Allstate Insurance Co., a diversity case where class action certification was sought in federal court to certify a claim based on New
York state law.278 In one version of proposed rules to “Fix Shady
Grove,” the Advisory Committee suggested amending the rule’s
language to demonstratively state that the discretion whether or not
to approve certification resides with the federal district court.279
In early 2012, the Advisory Committee attended the Standing
Committee’s meeting, seeking to reignite discussion on class actions
on the basis that enough time had passed since the 2003 amendments
and since CAFA had come into effect to warrant a review of the
rules’ operation and effect.280 The Advisory Committee assembled
a panel, moderated by Judge Lee Rosenthal,281 to discuss the press-

based on mass tort claims? See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 35, at 1941; Bradt,
supra note 28, at 88; Bradt & Rave, supra note 44, at 1261; BURCH, supra note
94, at 2.
277
Agenda Book, Nov. 2011, supra note 276, at 633–36 (stating that “[s]trong
arguments can be made that the Court got it wrong . . . “). In the Agenda Book,
the following cases are discussed (in order of appearance): AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011);
Shady Grove Ortho. Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010); and WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
278
See generally Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559
U.S. 393, 393 (2010).
279
Agenda Book, Nov. 2011, supra note 276, at 643–44 (“[F]ederal courts
should not be backed by a happenstance drafting choice . . . .The new language
frees federal courts to decide this and similar questions without the pressure of a
seeming linguistic mandate to certify no matter whether there is any federal interest in expanding the state-created claim beyond the limits set by state law.”); see
also Wolff, supra note 104, at 1897.
280
Notes from Jan. 5, 2012 Standing Comm. Rule 23 Panel, Agenda Item 11C, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Mar. 22-23, 2012, at 483
[hereinafter Agenda Book, Mar. 2012].
281
Currently sitting as Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, Chief Judge Rosenthal was appointed to the federal court in
1992 by George H. W. Bush. Chief Judge Rosenthal approved the settlement
agreement in a class action alleging unconstitutional proceedings in bail hearings.
See Texas Memorandum and Opinion Preliminarily Approving the Proposed
Consent Decree and Settlement Agreement and Approving and Directing Issuance
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ing issues related to Rule 23, including, again, the absence of a provision that specifically addressed settlement class actions.282 The
panelists argued that, especially in the case of mass tort litigation,
the lack of guidance in the rules “has tended to push settlements . . . outside the court system,” or at least “outside judicial supervision under Rule 23(e).”283 Judge Rosenthal boldly phrased her
reflection, querying whether the panelists “are urging [the Committee] to reject the statement in Amchem that satisfying 23(e) is not a
substitute for satisfying 23(a) and (b).”284
By March 2012, another Rule 23 Subcommittee was formed,
this time under the leadership of Judge Michael W. Mosman.285 The
Subcommittee identified five issues for the Advisory Committee’s
consideration, with settlement class certification listed as its first
“front burner issue.”286 The Subcommittee suggested drafting rules
to explicitly overturn Amchem, stating, “At least some seem to think
it would be useful to reconsider the Supreme Court’s attitude that
Rule 23(e)’s fairness review is no substitute for full application of
Rule 23(a) and (b) analysis of the cohesiveness of the class.”287

of Class Notice, ODonell v. Harris County, No. 16-cv-01414 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 5,
2019).
282
Agenda Book, Mar. 2012, supra note 280, at 54.
283
Id. at 54, 490 (referencing In Re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp.
2d 488 (E.D.N.Y 2006). In Re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606
(E.D. La. 2008) proceeded by way of consolidation by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation).
284
Id. at 491.
285
Judge Michael W. Mosman, U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon,
was appointed in 2003 by George W. Bush. He served as chief judge from 20162019. Michael Mosman, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Michael_Mosman
(last visited Oct. 12, 2022).
286
Id. at 455.
287
Id. at 457. The Advisory Committee initially found hope in the Third Circuit decision Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011), which it
read as formulating a distinction between a review for certification versus for trial.
Yet, again, the Advisory Committee’s interests were thwarted by the Supreme
Court. Writing for the court in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013),
Justice Scalia wrote, “Repeatedly, we have emphasized that . . . ‘certification is
proper only if “the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.”’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
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B. Preparing Rules for Notice and Comment
By the Advisory Committee’s April 2015 meeting, the Subcommittee288 held four conference calls and presented at the ABA National Institute on Class Actions in Chicago.289 The Subcommittee
continued to be concerned about whether the benefits of amending
Rule 23(e) outweighed the costs of “a period of uncertainty, particularly if it supersede[d] current prevailing case law in various circuits.”290 Nevertheless, the Subcommittee sketched out early drafts
of amendments, including, again, a delineation of factors to consider
when assessing whether a settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate.291
Still determined to address the issue of certification for the purposes of approving a proposed settlement, the Subcommittee also
resurrected Rule 23(b)(4) from the 1996 proposed amendments,
now proffering two possible versions for a new and improved Rule
23(b).292 For both versions, the Subcommittee suggested an approach that would “place primary reliance on superiority and the invigorated settlement review” and “remove emphasis on predominance when settlement certification is under consideration.”293 The
proposed rule would effectively overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes in the context of settlement
288

For this iteration, the subcommittee consisted of Judge Robert Dow (Judge
of the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois), who presented the
Rule 23 Subcommittee’s report, as well as two lawyers and two law professors.
Report of the Rule 23 Subcommittee, Agenda Item 8-A, Meeting of Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, Apr. 9-10, 2015, at 73, 9 [hereinafter Agenda Book,
Apr. 2015].
289
Agenda Book, Apr. 2015, supra note 288, at 73; see also Marcus, supra
note 95, at 922 n.99 (listing the dates and locations of the conference calls that
took place before the Advisory Committee’s April 2015 meeting).
290
Agenda Book, Apr. 2015, supra note 288, at 247.
291
Agenda Book, Nov. 2015, supra note 90, at 106. The Subcommittee proffered two versions. Alternative 1 listed four factors to “consider,” making it more
relaxed than Alternative 2, which required the presence of those factors. Id. at
113, 156. At the 2015 mini-conference, some participants saw these amendments
as “a solution in search of a problem.” Id. at 168.
292
Agenda Book, Apr. 2015, supra note 288, at 258–59. Both versions of the
new proposed Rule 23(b) included language that would have had judges assessing
whether the proposed settlement was “superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Id.
293
Id. at 257–58.
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class actions, by making explicit that the resolution of the dispute
was more important than the question of whether issues common to
the class outweighed issues affecting individual class members.294
In September 2015, the Rule 23 Subcommittee organized a mini
conference at the Grand Hyatt in Dallas, Texas.295 Among the nine
items the Subcommittee put forward for the attendees’ consideration
was the issue of the how rigorous the court had to be in assessing
class certification criteria.296 The Subcommittee put its proposed
Rule 23(b)(4) to the conference participants for their consideration,
stressing that the holding in Amchem indicated that the fact of settlement is relevant to class certification.297 The Subcommittee defended its resurrection of previously proposed Rule 23(b)(4) by explaining:
Increasing confidence in the ability of courts to evaluate proposed settlements, and the tools available to
them for doing so, provides important support for the
addition of subdivision (b)(4) . . . . Given the added
confidence in settlement review afforded by
strengthening Rule 23(e), the Committee is comfortable with reduced emphasis on some provisions of
Rule 23(a) and (b).298
By April 2016,299 the Subcommittee had a draft prepared for the
Advisory Committee’s approval. The draft no longer included Rule
294

See id. at 260–61.
In preparation for the mini-conference, the subcommittee held seven conference calls, received submissions from twenty-five sources, and had representatives attend class action-themed conferences. Attending the mini-conference was
the Subcommittee plus six judges, close to twenty lawyers and seven law professors. Agenda Book, Nov. 2015, supra note 90, at 163; see also ADVISORY COMM.
ON CIV. RULES, List of Participants in the Civil Rule 23 Mini-Conference: September 11, 2015, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/list_of_participants_in_the_civil_rule_23_mini-conference.pdf.
296
Agenda Book, Nov. 2015, supra note 90, at 179.
297
See id. at 35–36.
298
Id. at 126.
299
In an effort to prepare draft amendments in time for the Standing Committee’s June meeting, following the Rule 23 mini-conference and the Advisory
Committee’s November 2015 meeting, the Rule 23 Subcommittee held six conference calls and attended the January meeting of the Standing Committee.
295
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23(b)(4).300 However, the proposed language for the Committee
Notes emphasized the unique situation presented by settlement class
actions.301 The amendments kept the language differentiating classes seeking to be certified as part of a settlement agreement.302 Additionally, the revised Committee Notes would unambiguously
state, “[a]lthough the standards for certification differ for settlement
and litigation purposes . . . the court cannot make the decision regarding the prospects for certification without a suitable basis in the
record.”303 Ultimately, the Advisory Committee recommended six
changes to Rule 23, “many of which concern[ed] settlements in class
action lawsuits.”304
C. Climax: Congress . . . Again?
Rule 23 was among four civil rules packages that the Standing
Committee approved for public comment at its June 2016 meeting.305 Meanwhile, in April, House Judiciary Committee Chairman
Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) introduced a bill, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of
2016.306 Goodlatte described the bill as responding to a judiciary
desperate but ineffective to stop class action abuses.307 Here, too,
Agenda Book, Nov. 2015, Report of the Rule 23 Subcommittee, supra note 90, at
95.
300
The Current Preliminary Draft Package Recommended for Transmittal to
the Standing Committee, Agenda Item A-1, Meeting of Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, Apr. 14-15, 2016, at 96.
301
See id.
302
Id. at 97.
303
Id. at 102.
304
Minutes, Agenda Item 1-B, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, Nov. 3-4, 2016, at 32.
305
Id. at 3; see also COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. AND PROC. OF THE JUD. CONF.
OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF APPELLATE, BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2016),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-08
preliminary_draft_of_rules_forms_published_for_public_comment_0.pdf. In addition to
receiving written comments, the Advisory Committee solicited feedback at public
hearings in Washington, D.C. (November 3, 2016), Phoenix, Arizona (January 4,
2017), and in Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas (February 16, 2017).
306
H.R. 1927 (114th) and introduced as Fairness in Class Action Litigation
and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong.
(2017).
307
H.R. REP. NO. 115-25, at 2 (2017).
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Congress directly infringed on the judiciary’s authority to draft rules
for litigation procedure.308 It proposed prohibiting federal courts
from certifying class actions that sought monetary relief for personal
injury or economic loss, unless class members suffered “the same
type and scope of injury as the named class representative” or a “reliable and administratively feasible mechanism” was available to
distribute monetary relief “directly to a substantial majority of class
members.”309 The bill sought to regulate attorney’s fees by prohibiting fees greater than the total amount distributed to class members
and by requiring the withholding of fees until after class members
recovered.310 Finally, the bill required the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts to collect information on disbursement of funds for
the purpose of publishing an annual report.311
In response, on February 14, 2017, two days before the final
public hearing on the 2016 rules amendments package, Judge David
G. Campbell, Chair of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and Senior Judge John D. Bates, Chair of the Advisory Committee, sent a letter to members of Congress expressing their concerns.312 The judges directly addressed the issue of Congress’s interest in amending rules of procedure, and pleaded with members of
Congress to respect the delegation of rulemaking authority to the
judiciary, writing:
The Judicial Conference has long opposed direct
amendment of the federal rules by legislation . . . . This has not been a matter of protecting
“turf,” but instead has reflected a strong preference
on the part of the judiciary for the thorough and inclusive procedures of the Rules Enabling

308

See Marcus, supra note 95, at 938.
H.R. 985 at 4–5.
310
Id. at 6.
311
See Information Item: Legislation, Agenda Item III, Meeting of Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, Apr. 25-26, 2017, at 95.
312
Letter from J. David G. Campbell and J. John D. Bates of the Jud. Conf. of
the U.S. to Bob Goodlatte, Chairman of the Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 14,
2017),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/supplemental-materials2017-06-standing-agenda-book_0.pdf.
309
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Act . . . . More than 80 years of experience has shown
that the process works very well.313
On March 9, 2017, the House of Representatives narrowly
passed H.R. 985, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of
2017.314 The bill was never passed by the Senate.315
Few changes were made to the proposed amendments following
the period for public comment, and in 2017, the Advisory Committee recommended the proposed amendments to the Judicial Conference for approval.316 The amendments to Rule 23(c), (e), and (f)
were adopted by the Supreme Court and transmitted to Congress,
and then came into effect on December 1, 2018.317 After almost
thirty years of work on settlement class actions, the Advisory Committee eked out a partial win in its efforts to create a distinct procedure for class actions that are brought to the court at the same time
as their proposed settlement.318 Rule 23(e) now explicitly refers to
classes “proposed to be certified for purposes of settlement.”319
Moreover, the Committee Notes put an end to the nearly thirty year
saga by writing that while the court must have a “suitable basis in
the record” for certifying a class, “the standards for certification differ for settlement and litigation purposes.”320
CONCLUSION
The experiences of judges working with the Advisory Committee highlights the contested nature of procedural rulemaking. In addition to competition between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s bars to
313

Id. at 2.
H.R. 985 at 19.
315
Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/985/text.
316
Draft Minutes of the Jan. 3, 2017, Agenda Item I-A, Meeting of Committee
on Rules and Practice and Procedure, June 12-13, 2017, at 31; Minutes, Meeting
of Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Nov. 7, 2017, at 1.
317
See Chart Tracking Proposed Rule Amendments, Agenda Item 1-B, Meeting of Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, June 12, 2018, at 50.
318
See id.
319
FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 23(e).
320
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 Advisory Committee’s note to 2018 amendment at subdivision (e)(1) (emphasis added).
314
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secure rules favorable to their interests, judges must contend with
congressional politics and internal hierarchical politics between the
different levels of courts. Judges’ efforts to draft rules to reflect the
prominence of settlements in mass tort class actions triggered the
Supreme Court’s attention. Consequently, rather than allowing the
rulemaking process to proceed, and notwithstanding the deliberative
democratic nature321 of the procedures required under Rules Enabling Act, in 1996 the Supreme Court availed itself of its superior
status and took discussion of Rule 23 off the table. Judges of the
Advisory Committee—usually district and circuit court judges—
continued to compete with the U.S. Supreme Court, often including
proposals that directly or indirectly sought to overturn Supreme
Court decisions.322 Judges also lobbied and debated with Congress
about multiple issues related to judges’ authority to manage Rule 23
actions, including the timing of appeals, properly addressing duplicative actions in federal and state courts, and judicial monitoring of
attorney’s fees.323
Understandably, scholars who study judicial politics scrutinize
judges’ decisions. Scholars analyze the impact of decisions on the
political realm,324 and investigate behavioral or theoretical “determinants of their decisions”325—how judges decide and the factors
that go into judicial decision-making. Yet exploring those practices
of knowledge formation326 without probing into the politics of
judges’ institutional work leaves crucial activities—including those
that will affect substantive rights—unexamined. While socio-legal
scholars argue that legal knowledge is produced socially, as it relates
to judges and courts, scholars have unfortunately tended to limit
their view to one set of practices.327
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In contrast, this Article described judges’ other work reforming
procedures for the review of settlement agreements in mass tort class
actions, and detailed the politics and practices involved. The Article
demonstrated that procedural reform is not merely a technical legal
affair. Rather, it involves politics and competition for the authority
to articulate rules, competition that can arise both between Congress
and the Judicial Conference, and as well as between the judges of
committees and of the Supreme Court. While judicial behavior research studies the “distal politics” of party politics, more proximate
politics are to be found in the power struggles within the “legal complex”328 and between “large aggregations of power”329 vying for the
authority to articulate rules of legal procedure. Conservative or liberal judiciaries are not impervious monoliths, and competition for
power within the legal system does not always present as judges’
interests in deciding a case this or that way. Judges also have interests in more indirect instantiations of power, such as institutional
power to guide and constrain the actions of others, or a structural
power that derives from the social capacities of subjects positioned
in relation to one another.330 The politics and practices of judges’
work on rulemaking and procedural reform of fairness hearings for
class action settlements demonstrates that scholars must scrutinize
not only their final dispositions, but also judges’ work structuring
and setting criteria for the way disputes are heard.
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